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Ines Sieckmann and Odila Triebel (eds.): Introduction 
 
“Experiments have […] shown that when a group of individuals are given unrestricted 
access to harvest from a common-pool resource, they substantially overuse it. […] but 
changing only one variable, namely, the capacity to communicate with one another, in-
dividuals can come to agreements and keep them to harvest very close to an optimal 
level.“ Elinor Ostrom, pioneer researcher on Global Public Goods 
 
It is understood that only through global cooperation can we effectively combat global 
challenges such as climate change and security. Emerging economies, like China, play a 
crucial role in this endeavour. While we outspokenly share a common interest in counter-
ing shared threats or at least mitigating negative effects of global challenges, many obsta-
cles to cooperation between China and Europe remain. Not only do different levels of 
development infringe on ambitious and binding shared climate targets, but different 
mindsets and intercultural misunderstandings also impact on the level of cooperation. 
With its economic growth, and along with a change in self-perception, China was ex-
pected to take on more responsibility in global governance. This anthology takes a closer 
look into how China redefines its role in the governance of different Global Public Goods 
(GPGs) and elaborates on possible joint global goals and the impact of differences in cul-
tural perceptions, especially between China and the EU.  
 
GPGs are challenged whenever the consumption of shared resources is not balanced 
with the needs of the wider community. The individual use cannot be adequately priced 
and markets typically fail in providing these goods. No single nation, however powerful, 
can produce these goods on its own. Therefore, policy interventions have to promote 
collective action, starting with agreements between actors involved to provide specific 
public goods. GPGs transcend national borders; they emerge from a multi-level process, 
requiring policy action at national, regional and global levels.  Challenges regarding GPGs 
depend on effective international cooperation and coordination and thus comprise policy 
interdependence among countries. (Kaul 2013)  
 
The growing challenge of providing GPGs, however, occurs at a time when interna-
tional patterns of decision making are in flux due to the rise of emerging economic and 
political powers like Brazil, India, China and South Africa, while the USA are redefining 
their role as an international actor. As for a long time, emerging powers justifiably felt left 
out in many norm-making processes (UN Security Council, the Bretton Woods institu-
tions, the G7 and the G20) the inclusion of emerging powers in the provision of GPGs is 
inevitable. This is not only due to their rising capacities and power but also for reasons of 
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fairness (Jürgensen 2014). When the existing system does not effectively include these 
demands, coalitions outside the established system can arise. 
 
In order to design cooperation that gains the trust and legitimacy of all the parties en-
gaged the differences in perceptions of the actors involved need to be taken into account. 
This requires a profound learning process on all sides about the Self and the Other. The 
purpose of this volume is to provide reflection on differences in perspectives and concepts 
in EU-China relations in order to contribute to better informed and therefore more sus-
tainable external action.  
 
Many authors in this anthology point towards changes in China’s mindset and its tak-
ing over of new responsibilities in global governance. In a public panel discussion at the 
IV. Public Diplomacy Forum1, 7-8th October 2015 in Berlin, Yiwei Wang, an expert on 
China’s international relations, points out important changes in China’s mindset about 
climate change during the last years: Starting from the initial belief that Western climate 
discourse was mainly aimed at slowing down China’s rise, China increasingly came to 
trust in the importance of mitigating climate change, but insisted on doing this unilateral-
ly; only recently, it has taken on a more cooperative approach in the international system. 
“China has now adopted the dream of clean air and water, something you already take for 
granted in Germany“. 
 
This volume discusses public goods such as security and infrastructure. Thus, the fol-
lowing publication covers timely relevant topics due to new debates on multilateralism in 
the global arena. Engagement for GPGs can aim for international reputation and respect. 
This strategy relies on the premise that taking responsibility for common interests serves 
peaceful cohabitation better than pursuing primarily unilateral interests. As a governance 
model this needs new invigoration.  
 
International cooperation in support of GPG provision is for sure also driven by “en-
lightened self-interest” (Gavas 2013). However, a modernisation dilemma leads to con-
tested priorities. Cultural relations can help to provide culture as a GPG and at the same 
time serve to create foundations of understanding for international cooperation for other 
                                               
1 The Forum was a cooperation between Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of Foreign Relations), the 
Charhar Institute and ifa funded by the Robert Bosch Stiftung. More information about the Forum are 
available online: https://publicdiplomacyforum.ifa.de 
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GPGs. Trust is needed so that geostrategic competition is not a stronger interest than the 
common good.  
 
Yiwei Wang states along the same line: “By building Chinese soft power and changing 
China’s rise from a hard rise to a soft rise (rising in norms, not just markets; rising in val-
ues, not just goods), public diplomacy can be the lubricant for China’s rise.“ But how is 
China’s new global role perceived? How does it engage in global governance of important 
GPGs? 
 
China, due to its sheer size, is an indispensable partner in the solution of global prob-
lems and is hence also expected to increase its engagement in global politics. This can also 
be confirmed for the different GPGs analysed in this volume. But this increasing involve-
ment is not without complication. Some see China as an incumbent power challenging 
status-quo powers, hence impacting on the existing global order. With its “new assertive-
ness“ noted by many, China stresses an interest in bringing in its own definitions and 
wielding influence on existing rules of the game. Therefore, it is important to understand 
China’s point of view, its concepts and strategies in different policy areas, especially with 
view to GPGs – because governing GPGs requires shared reference points and joint strat-
egies.  
 
This volume offers short analyses of China’s role in international relations with regard 
to various GPGs. Taking these different observations into account, what do we learn 
about China’s emerging role as an international political player? The Chinese government 
cares about its international image as a responsible power, but this image hinges on ques-
tions of credibility and accountability.  
 
In a famous article reprinted in this volume, Shambaugh describes how, in recent 
years, Beijing has been launching “a major public relations offensive“ to improve percep-
tions of China throughout the world, but he questions the scope and credibility of such a 
propagandistic top-down approach in increasing soft power, which - following Nye - 
emanates mainly from society. In a similar vein, Kim questions the credibility of this 
“charm offensive.“ Drawing on the example of the GPGs associated with the Belt and 
Road Initiative, such as infrastructure and connectivity, he points out that China, as a 
rising power, faces a dilemma as these GPGs “may be perceived by others as private 
goods to enhance China’s geostrategic national interests even at the expense of others’ 
interests.“ Similarly, Ding sees China’s attempts at shaping an image as a “responsible 
great power“ challenged by its growing assertiveness, i. e. in handling territorial disputes 
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with its neighbours as well as by its internal lack of political plurality, accountability and 
rule of law. For Ding, the latter aspects result in doubts about an authoritarian China’s 
willingness to adhere to international norms.  
 
The authors find an increase of engagement by China in the global governance of 
GPGs, but point towards differences in definitions, concepts, sets of actors and expecta-
tions of government frameworks between China and Western approaches. Breslin de-
scribes how, through crises such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and the 
bird flu, Chinese perceptions of security shifted towards concepts of non-traditional secu-
rity and increased the overall importance of international cooperation for China, while he 
points towards the need of finding common grounds in key reference points for a joint 
security agenda.  
 
Sieckmann views intercultural understanding as an important basis for transnational 
cooperation and the co-creation of ideas between China and the EU, but European actors 
need to be aware of sharp differences in concepts of culture – with a top-down approach, 
Chinese state censorship and the accentuation of unity on the one side and bottom-up 
actors stressing Europe’s diversity and freedom of expression on the other. 
 
With its growing assertiveness, China is increasingly engaging in international fora 
and even aiming at reshaping global governance frameworks to defend its interests. 
Arsène describes how China – as a rising cyber power – recently increased its engagement 
in global internet governance – a field of global governance that, to date, is shaped by a 
myriad of actors through rough consensus. While stressing non-interference in domestic 
cyber policy, on the global stage, China is pushing for an interstate mechanism to increase 
its influence in regulating the internet – seeing the internet through the lens of the ruling 
party rather than in terms of a global public good.  
 
The EU is still seen as an important partner in China. Chaban et al. look into the per-
ception of the EU in China, finding that although the two perceived “crises“– of dept and 
of refugees - have had an impact on the EU’s image abroad, in China it is still viewed as a 
modern and developed economy and the third most important partner after the US and 
Russia.   
 
Despite differences pointed out between China and Western democracies in terms of 
political concepts, policy approaches and types of actors, GPGs can serve as important 
starting points to find common reference points for further cooperation. China’s Belt and 
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Road Initiative and the Sustainable Development Goals could serve as examples of taking 
up international responsibility for GPGs. Wang presents a view of the Belt and Road 
Initiative as a project to share insights from China’s own development reform with coun-
tries along the 21st century Silk Road, promoting peace, security and prosperity and 
thereby bridging the gap in public goods’ demand and delivery.  
 
As gender inequalities are resurging under China’s current economic development 
path and women are disproportionally hit by the economic cool down in China, Perry 
proposes gender equality to be included as an integral component in political and devel-
opmental initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative.  
 
GPGs have in common that they necessitate international and often transnational co-
ordination and cooperation and China is increasing its engagement. This also insinuates 
the necessity of a common ground in terms of defining the public interest with view to 
each GPG and in terms of setting up each GPG’s intergovernmental and/or transnational 
governance – and which actors to involve. Differences, both in concept definitions and 
political set-up, impact on fruitful cooperation between China and the EU and have to be 
taken into consideration when targeting each policy issue in order to find agreements. As 
the complex governance of GPGs often also involves a multitude of non-state actors, this 
creates additional complexity when dealing with more state-centric structures of an au-
thoritarian state.  
 
To attain fruitful cooperation, common reference points and levels of trust have to be 
reached, as well as an understanding for the remaining differences on both sides. 
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Natalia Chaban, Olga Gulyaeva and Suetyi Lai: Images and Perceptions as a Re-
source in Public Diplomacy: Images of the EU in China 
 
Public Diplomacy in a Globalising World 
The days are long gone when diplomacy was synonymous with elitist, secretive negotia-
tions, conducted exclusively by state actors. On the one side, the reality of a rapidly glob-
alising world brings a range of non-state actors who are not shy about becoming active 
producers of diplomacy outcomes (a process of “multi-stakeholder diplomacy”, as ob-
served and classified by Hocking 2006). Among these new producers of diplomatic out-
puts are non-governmental organisations, corporate actors, powerful and influential indi-
viduals, and multilateral (e. g. UN, NATO, Commonwealth) and supranational (e. g. the 
European Union (EU)) entities. They are all competing for global attention with each other 
and with “traditional” state actors. Unsurprisingly, a more crowded line-up of diplomacy 
producers pushes many state actors around the world to “pay more attention to the poli-
tics of credibility” in a world where they have to “share a stage newly empowered with 
non-governmental actors and individuals” (Nye 2002: 76). This includes the public diplo-
macy of China – an emerging power that is credited with a new global role in the multipo-
lar architecture of the world. The focus of this chapter is on China-EU interactions and the 
role of perceptions and mediated communication in shaping public diplomacy strategies. 
 
Images and perceptions of important international counterparts – observed among 
members of the public and surfacing in the discourses that shape public opinion – become 
key indicators for informed public diplomacy strategies. In the case of interactions, a 
survey of EU images and perceptions in Chinese discourse and among the general public 
will give the EU (as a producer of public diplomacy outreach towards China) an oppor-
tunity to listen to the themes about and evaluations of the EU that matter to Chinese so-
ciety. Such attentive listening will help to fine-tune the EU’s public diplomacy messages 
and actions. This link between EU perceptions and its public diplomacy practice has been 
extensively elaborated in the relevant literature (Chaban/Holland 2015; Chaban/Belt-
yukova 2014; Chaban 2013/14). 
 
Theoretical Framing 
This analysis of perceptions of the Self and the Other has a theoretical basis. Our argu-
ment is grounded in the model of the “semiotic square” (Greimas 1983). The semiotic 
square is postulated by Greimas to be the elementary structure of meaning. The model 
applied to study the meaning of Self-Other interactions (Chaban 1995) comes with the 
following four-member paradigm in our study of perceptions in EU-China interactions:   
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1) what the Self thinks about the Other (China’s images of the EU); 2) what the Other 
thinks about the Self (the EU’s images of China); 3) what the Self thinks about the Self in 
relation to the Other (China’s self-images when it sees itself dealing with the EU); and  
4) what the Other thinks about the Other in relation to the Self (the EU’s self-images when 
it imagines itself in relation to China). This paradigm suggests that an informed inquiry 
into Self-Other interactions and imaginations – critical for successful public diplomacy – is 
a complex and multifaceted exercise. 
 
Here we propose a focus on the first dimension, linking it to another theoretical mod-
el, Othering, which is also used in the perception studies (Chaban/Holland 2014). Accord-
ing to this theoretical model, consideration of what the Self thinks about the Other tells us 
less about the Other than about the Self, who chooses to perceive facets and features that 
are the most meaningful for the Self; or, to quote French writer Anaïs Nin, “We do not see 
things how they are, we see things how we are” (Nin 1961). Chaban and Holland (2014) 
argue that such a perspective serves as an “invaluable resource” that contributes to more 
informed external action, which “stresses mastery of the skills of ‘listening to’ and ‘talking 
with’ the world”. 
 
Case Study 
We undertook a systematic analysis of EU images and perceptions in public opinion and 
in opinion-shaping discourses in the influential Chinese press (observations in 2011/12 
and 2015). While the 2011/12 period was marked by the peak of the Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis, 2015 was seen as a year when the EU started to slowly emerge from this crisis. 
Yet 2015 featured a nascent migration crisis that was not observed in 2011, in addition to 
the impacts of the on-going Ukraine crisis. In China, 2015 saw an economic slowdown that 
became the “new normal” first mentioned by President Xi in 2014, which meant a farewell 
to the high-speed growth rate. The year also saw a continuing emphasis and a strong 
message on China’s foreign policy vision, the Belt and Road Initiative first proposed in 
2013. This initiative maps China’s interaction with the world in terms of a renewed Silk 
Road (from Asia through the Middle East and Africa to Europe) and creates a new con-
cept of a Maritime Silk Road (with new partnerships in Southeast Asia, Oceania and 
North and East Africa). What do changing images and perceptions of the EU tell us about 
China’s self-perceptions – when seen through the images of the Other (the EU)? Have 
references to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the European migration crisis as key 
events resulted in Chinese views of the EU that confirm the phenomenon of China’s “new 
assertiveness”? Have changing images contributed to the Chinese impression of Europe in 
decline? 
Images and Perceptions as a Resource in Public Diplomacy: Images of the EU in China by Natalia 
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The cognitive structures of images and perceptions are known for their resistance to 
change. If the change in images happens in a short period of time, it is usually due to 
critical events of a major magnitude (see Braudel’s paradigm of temporary changes in 
images discussed by Didelon-Loiseau and Grasland 2014). The EU’s financial and refugee 
crises are seen by some observers as one of these critical junctures that triggers negative 
shifts in EU global perceptions and self-images of confidence and assertiveness, especially 
among emerging powers. China’s dissent towards the EU’s reaction to the Syria crisis and 
EU pressures on the appreciation of the renminbi may further add to this sentiment. Thus, 
our first hypothesis is that Chinese public opinion and media frames will register a visible 
deterioration in the EU’s image over time. 
 
However, we also hypothesise that images of the EU will not change significantly. 
This could be due to the images’ universal characteristic to resist change. But it could also 
be due to the peculiarities of the reflections by the Self. The Self still chooses to reflect on 
the facets of the Other that matter most to the Self. In this light, a possible lack of change 
to the negative in EU images may suggest that for China the EU’s “crises” are not seen as 
that “critical” or “identity-changing”. It may also mean that certain features of EU interna-
tional identity remain stable in the imagination of the Chinese public and public opinion-
shaping discourses. However, stability in the image, especially in media discourses, may 
be linked to the nature of government-media relations in China (characterised by exten-
sive government control over the media) and the government’s particular vision of rela-
tions with the EU. The Chinese government’s policy is to maintain good relations with the 
EU, as China has substantial trade with and investment into the EU, and one quarter of 
China’s foreign reserves are kept in euros. When reporting on the EU, the media may pick 
up on clues from the government on how to present the EU in order to legitimise the EU 
in the eyes of the citizens as a “good friend” and a “profitable partner” for China. 
 
We test our two hypotheses using empirical evidence from two large-scale compara-
tive projects – “After Lisbon: Images of the EU in the Asia Pacific” (Australia, India, Japan, 
Mainland China, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, South Korea and Thai-
land)(2011-12) and “EU Perceptions in ten Strategic Partners of the EU: Analysis of the 
Perception of the EU and EU’s Politics Abroad” (Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the USA) (2015).2 In this chapter we will 
                                               
2 For more information, see international research project "EU Global Perceptions". 
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examine some key findings from the public opinion surveys3 (2012 vs. 2015), as well as 
media analysis with a special focus on the influential People’s Daily (2011 vs. 2015). The 
choice of People’s Daily for this analysis is not random. As “the biggest newspaper in Chi-
na,”4 owned and run by the Chinese Communist Party, it is known to signal China’s offi-
cial positions to the Chinese and international audiences, and inform and set agendas for 
regional and local media outlets within China. It boasts high circulation: according to the 
2013 statistical indicators, the daily circulation of the People’s Daily was three million cop-
ies and its official website reached a daily visit rate of 400 million readers. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Media: 2011 vs. 2015 
Volume and Intensity 
Both of the periods of observation included reports on top-level interactions between the 
EU and China. Although the intensity of interactions between the EU and China at the 
highest level seemed to remain undiminished or even increase over the years, interest in 
the EU on the part of the influential, government-run People’s Daily seemed to visibly 
decrease.5 In 2015, other events seemed to overshadow EU-focused news and attract 
newsmakers’ attention. These included China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative, and China’s “new normal”, along with the 
election in the UK and a military parade in Moscow. A decrease in the volume of coverage 
between 2011 and 2015 is of potential concern to Chinese and EU public diplomacy practi-
tioners. Specifically, less volume of coverage in a major opinion-forming agenda-shaping 
newspaper means less space to report on links and collaborations between the two part-
ners. This may potentially translate into the idea that “if it isn’t reported, it can’t be im-
portant.” 
 
 
                                               
3 The surveys for the two projects were administered by TNS London in 2012 and 2015. The 2012 survey 
was conducted in March and collected 1,009 responses (the margin of error is ±3.1% with a confidence 
level of 95%). The 2015 survey was conducted in August with 1,410 respondents (the margin of error is 
±2.6% with a confidence level of 95%). 
4 According to the People’s Daily official website, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/50142/104580/, 
accessed on 4 March 2015. 
5 Between January and June 2011, a six-month observation period of the People’s Daily resulted in 82.8 
articles per month on average, and a three-month monitoring period between April and June 2015 
registered 46 news articles per month on average. 
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In 2011, the EU featured only occasionally in news stories as the major actor, and in 
over half of all coverage the EU was cast as a minor actor, with the EU typically limited to 
just one or two sentence in a news article (Figure 1). Such patterns of visibility present a 
challenge to public diplomacy conceptions and delivery. Dominant minor centrality sug-
gests a limited opportunity to present the EU – as an existing or potential counterpart for 
China and its various publics – in a detailed, nuanced way. In 2015, we observed only a 
slight increase in the EU’s centrality in news reporting. 
 
 
Figure 1: Degree of centrality of EU news, 2011 and 2015 compared 
 
 
Sources of EU News 
Our next question was to identify the sources of EU news. The heavy reliance on local 
sources was found in both years of analysis – 81.4% of EU news in 2011 and 96.4% in 2015. 
Some of these local authors were based in China, while more than half were staff journal-
ists posted overseas. Foreign sources (foreign correspondents and international news 
wires) were extremely rare. News agencies, either local or foreign, were seldom a sole 
source of news. If a news agency was used, typically it was Xinhua, China’s state news 
agency. 
 
This particular profile of sources suggests there is serious potential for the practice of 
public diplomacy. Local journalists could be engaged in various programmes of exchang-
es, cooperation and collaboration with their European counterparts as part of public di-
plomacy campaigns that originate in both the EU and China. Initial approaches could be 
made to those who are the most frequent reporters of EU/Europe-themed news. Not only 
are they the ones who will be interested in covering EU affairs in general, but they are also 
potentially more open to reporting on EU-China interactions in various fields. 
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Themes and Evaluations 
In both years, the People’s Daily prioritised reporting on economic and political issues 
relating to the EU, with the economic frame slightly more visible. The third most visible 
frame in 2011 and 2015 was EU social and cultural affairs. In both years, EU news about 
energy, development and the environment was peripheral (Figure 2). 
 
In the 2015 sample, the economic reporting focused on the Greek debt problems and 
the slow growth and potential recovery of the Eurozone economy. Turning to politics, the 
newspaper was more interested in the EU’s external political actions in general and the 
China-EU partnership in particular. In the coverage of social and cultural affairs, in 2011 
the news focused on cultural events, and specifically on youth exchanges (2011 was a year 
of EU-China Youth Dialogue). In contrast to 2011, the socio-cultural issue most frequently 
covered in 2015 was the EU’s refugee crisis. Another visible news theme in 2015 was 
health care, especially more advanced food safety standards in the EU compared with 
those in China. In total, the People’s Daily seems to frame the EU as a somewhat challenged 
international actor, yet still a worthy counterpart to China in a number of spheres. 
 
 
Figure 2: Thematic frames of EU news, 2011 and 2015 compared 
 
In both years, neutrality dominated the People’s Daily reportage of the EU (Figure 3). If 
we set aside neutral evaluations, in 2011, EU political actions were evaluated more fre-
quently from a positive (18.4%) rather than negative (3.1%) point of view. In 2015, EU 
political actions were even more positively evaluated (35.4%), especially those referring to 
the China-EU annual summit and celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the bilateral rela-
tionship. In 2011, EU economic actions received more negative evaluations (20.4%) than 
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positive ones (13.1%). This was due to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Such an evalua-
tion pattern was also observed in 2015 – the EU’s economic actions were presented pre-
dominantly with a negative tone (29.5%), particularly in the news on the prolonged Euro-
zone debt crisis and the EU’s slow economic recovery. In 2011, EU social actions were 
evaluated positively in 23.1% and negatively in 15.4% of the news. In 2015, social actions 
were mostly negatively evaluated (31%) due to the news stories on the EU’s handling of 
the refugee crisis. 
 
The evaluation patterns discussed here present different meanings for public diplo-
macy. A dominant neutrality of EU images rendered by this important newspaper could 
be conducive for public diplomacy. This is further supported by political framings of the 
EU that have remained more positive than negative over the years. Yet a lingering and 
growing negativity in economic frames and a peaking negativity in socio-cultural frames 
are of concern, as the business and socio-cultural spheres are among the primary targets 
of public diplomacy campaigns. The political realm is usually seen as belonging to the 
sphere of traditional diplomacy. 
 
 
Figure 3: Evaluation of the EU, 2011 and 2015 compared 
 
“Local Hooks” 
Reporting international actors with “local hooks” is a framing technique that Ginsberg 
(2002: 53) called “localising”, or “giving people explicit reasons why they should care 
about a place by pegging the story directly to the local economy, local business, local 
culture, local immigrants.” 
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While EU news with local, Chinese “hooks” has decreased over time (37.1% in 2011 vs. 
30.7% in 2015), in terms of thematic priorities, this EU news has remained stable over 
time. It tends to prioritise themes relating to politics and the economy, with social themes 
following. When considering evaluations in EU representations, neutrality and negativity 
grew in the news where the Union was reported either in an exclusive European or global 
context. In EU news with a “local hook”, it was neutrality and positivity that grew over 
time. Positive assessments disseminated by an important national paper may affect the 
subsequent construction of the social and political reality of the EU as an international 
actor for domestic audiences. 
 
Public Opinion 
In 2012, the general public considered the EU to be a very important actor in relation to 
China, both now and in the future. In both questions, the Chinese public rated the EU as 
their third most important partner. Yet, the EU’s importance was placed by respondents 
below the importance of the USA and Russia, both now and in the future. In terms of 
general feeling, more than half of the survey respondents in China reported positive atti-
tudes towards the EU (51.6%) vs. 13.3% who saw the EU in a negative light.6 The EU was 
most commonly described as modern, efficient and arrogant. The EU was described the 
least as fair, hypocritical and likeable (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Words chosen by Chinese respondents to describe the EU (2012) 
 
In the 2015 survey, the EU’s leadership in world affairs was seen by the general public 
as desirable. Only 5.6% of interviewees responded negatively. Yet most respondents saw 
the USA and China, not the EU, as the major players in world affairs in the future. Similar 
to the findings of 2012, most of the survey respondents in China reported positive atti-
tudes towards the EU. The 2015 survey showed that these positive attitudes increased 
                                               
6 35% of respondents reported neither positive nor negative attitudes towards the EU.  
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from 51.6% in 2012 to 55.7% in 2015. Meanwhile, negative attitudes decreased to 5.3% in 
2015. Compared to other international organisations, the EU was evaluated positively, 
behind only the UN and the WTO. With regard to the China-EU relationship, 57% of 
respondents saw it as either “very good” or “rather good”. In comparison, only 29.5% of 
respondents viewed the China-US relationship in a positive light. 
 
The EU was most commonly described as multicultural,7 modern and strong; and least 
often described as hypocritical, aggressive or arrogant (Figure 5). These descriptors are in 
line with the generally positive view of the EU and the positive assessment of China’s 
relationship with the EU. The percentage of the Chinese public calling the EU “modern” 
has decreased significantly though. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Words chosen by Chinese respondents to describe the EU (2015) 
 
Concluding remarks 
In terms of Public Diplomacy (PD), we argue that the EU has invested a lot into its relation 
with China while the Chinese government also has been treating the EU as a close partner.  
However, internal crises of the EU inevitably damaged the image of the EU in China. PD 
cannot do much if the domestic reality is challenging. 
 
                                               
7 Importantly, “multicultural“ in the context of the EU migration crisis in 2015 could evoke both positive 
and negative associations. 
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In addition, PD of the EU to China has focused a lot on cooperation in social-cultural, 
sustainable development and human right protections. Yet, the most visible partnerships 
which were recognised by the People's Daily and general public remain the ones in econo-
my and politics. This, on one hand, reflected that Chinese public views external relations 
in a rather conventional way (i. e. focus on high politics). On the other hand, it also 
showed that the EU's PD experiences difficulties in projecting and communicating its 
image in China. 
 
Our research demonstrates that a systematic analysis of powerful opinion-making 
news media combined with public opinion analysis may present a valuable resource for 
the practice of public diplomacy. In our case, we argue that this is a resource for both the 
EU’s (and potentially China's) public diplomacy towards each other. 
 
Insight into the EU’s framing in one powerful agenda-setting newspaper of national 
significance in China revealed that EU images are painted more negatively in some the-
matic fields (economy and social affairs) and EU news has decreased in volume. Also, EU 
news with “local hooks” seems to have become less visible over time. Lesser visibility in 
general and lesser visibility of EU news with a “local hook” in particular may result in 
lesser salience attached to the EU by the readers. More negativity in representing the EU 
as an economic and social affairs actor may have a multiplying, negative effect on a Chi-
nese society that values entrepreneurial and social aspects. It seems that our first hypothe-
sis – that Chinese media frames will register a visible deterioration of the EU’s images 
over time – is supported. 
 
However, our systematic nuanced analysis of the images and frames indicates that 
there are several counterbalances to the concerns formulated above. On the one hand, 
even though the overall volume of EU news was seen to be declining, the centrality in EU 
representations was observed to be growing. In other words, while there may be fewer 
articles about the EU, more of them are reporting the EU as a major central actor in the 
story. This contributes to a more elaborate profile of the EU in China. On the other hand, 
while negativity might be growing in some thematic areas, when assessed through the 
filter of the focus of domesticity, EU news with a local Chinese “hook” are increasingly 
featuring positive evaluations. These observations fine-tune our answer to the first hy-
pothesis. We argue that this media portrayal correlates with the public opinion. Public 
feeling towards the EU was more positive in 2015 than in 2012. Importantly, the high 
profile assigned to the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of EU-
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China relations in 2015 by government and leading newspapers influenced Chinese public 
views that the EU is a close partner. 
 
Our second hypothesis is therefore also partially supported – certain features of EU 
identity remain stable in the imagination of the Chinese public and public opinion-
shaping discourses, and the crises in Europe do not seem to have irrevocably damaged the 
EU’s image – the Chinese see the EU as one of the most important global poles and one of 
China's key partner (importantly, one of many, not the only one). This stability of EU 
images may serve as a basis for long-term public diplomacy strategies and actions be-
tween China and the EU. Future studies of the image of the EU – in key media (including 
social media, such as Weibo (China’s version of Twitter) and Wechat (China’s version of a 
combination of facebook and WhatsApp) and among the general public – will remain a 
critical contributor to fine-tuning public diplomacy practices in both the EU and China. 
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Shaun Breslin: Non Traditional Security for Who/What? Between the  
International, the National and the Human 
 
Security issues occupy a relatively minor role in Europe’s relations with China compared 
to finance and trade. This is partly because Europe is not a significant security actor in 
East Asia – something that makes Europe’s relationship with China very different from 
that of the United States. Indeed, the lack of bilateral security tensions creates a rather 
more conducive environment in which Europe can engage China compared to the lack of 
(security) trust that often shapes Sino-US relations. But this does not render the security 
arena totally unimportant. For example, Chinese acquiescence or opposition is crucial in 
either facilitating or blocking European security agendas at the United Nations. Moreover, 
if we move away from security defined as war (or threats of war) and other forms of mili-
tary conflict conducted by nation states, then we can identify areas where China and 
Europe might collaborate to provide Global Public Goods. In thinking of ways in which 
this potential can be transformed into actual progress, it is important to interrogate what 
we mean when we talk of security.  
 
This partly entails focusing on what is called “Non Traditional Security” (NTS); a term 
that covers a wide range of non-military sources of insecurity such as financial insecurity, 
environmental challenges, how best to ensure supplies of materials and food, the spread 
of infectious diseases and so on. It also includes violence and threats of violence that are 
not directed by states; most obviously, international terrorism. It also partly entails think-
ing about what or who should be secured and the main focus of security policy; if the aim 
is to maintain a stable international order, then the policies required will be very different 
from trying to ensure that individual human beings across the planet are free from fear 
and free from want. This then generates the secondary question of whether there is a 
shared understanding of the targets and means of a security agenda that might provide 
the basis for such cooperation. 
 
The “Traditional” Cold War Peace and Security Agenda 
The starting point is to think about three different levels of security that revolve around 
the question of what should be secured: international security, national security and hu-
man security. For the best part of half a century, the security agenda was dominated by 
the search for international security defined as preventing a third world war. To be sure, 
the attempt to guarantee the national security of key actors like the Soviet Union and the 
United States were crucial underpinnings of this agenda, but the overriding concern was 
to avoid war on a global scale that might have existential consequences for mankind. And 
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on reflection, we can say that the bipolar Cold War system did what it was intended to do 
– it kept “the peace”, with the peace here defined as preventing war in Europe and/or on a 
global scale. But keeping the peace in this definition did not equate to maintaining the 
security of everybody and keeping the peace everywhere.  
 
In order to ensure this combination of international security and the national security 
of the superpowers, political processes and actions were condoned, accepted and promot-
ed by the Great Powers that led to the abrogation of the national security of a number of 
states. This included abrogating the sovereignty of states that either threatened to move 
into the Communist camp (most notably but not only in Asia), or out of it (in Eastern 
Europe), prolonged “civil” wars in Asia that had strong inter-state dimensions, and per-
haps even bloody wars of independence and liberation that sometimes broke down along 
Cold War lines. It also included the toleration of a balance of power and legitimate 
spheres of influence that resulted in many millions living in fear under oppressive re-
gimes. 
 
In short, international security provided national security for the major powers, and 
through this also dealt with the major trans-national existential threat to the individuals of 
those nations – the threat of death as a result of nuclear war. But this was partly built on 
the lack of national security for many countries. In addition to facing the prospect of inter-
state war and involvement in a third world war, the national security of most states was at 
threat either from intervention by external forces, involvement in localised wars, or 
through internal challenges of civil war/wars of liberation. At an individual level, poverty, 
disease, migration, terrorism and state violence were all at least as clear and present dan-
gers to existence as nuclear war for most of the world’s population. Their Human Security 
(HS) – a concept we will return to shortly – was sacrificed to help maintain international 
security, and the national security of the world’s major powers.  
 
Non-Traditional Security (NTS): New Issues in Security 
With the end of the Cold War, the security agenda shifted and a new, “non-traditional” 
array of security issues increasingly attracted attention. This is partly because those with 
the most power to shape the nature of international security debates (and thus the focus of 
the security governance architectures), rethought what were the biggest existential chal-
lenges to the international system as a whole. More important, they also rethought the 
nature of the most significant national security challenges that they faced as well. In the 
West, the prospect of states becoming embroiled in inter-state wars has become much 
reduced – though events in Ukraine suggest not entirely eliminated. The chances of a 
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nuclear third world war were also much reduced; “rogue states” might at some point 
manage to fire off a weapon or two, but the prospect of a truly global nuclear conflict 
seemed very remote. But in thinking what was most likely to threaten the security of most 
Western states and their people, the focus turned towards supposedly “new” NTS chal-
lenges – though in truth these “new” security concerns had been a matter of life and death 
across the globe for many years: Combatting infectious diseases, terrorism and climate 
change, and ensuring cheap and adequate supplies of key commodities and resources 
now came to the fore in many national security agendas, and through these, into the in-
ternational security arena.  
 
Human Security (HS): A Shift Towards the Human as Point of Reference 
The end of the Cold War also created a space for the focus to move away from the needs 
of the most advanced and powerful states to the rest of the world as well; it wasn't just 
about the security of “us”, but also increasingly about the security of “them” in the devel-
oping world. There are a number of conflicting explanations for why this came about. For 
some, the end of the Cold War meant that we no longer needed to support authoritarian 
regimes just because they were on “our” side. For others, more important was the recogni-
tion that the origins of potential sources of national insecurity in the West (terrorism, 
disease and so on) often lay in poverty and instability in other parts of the world. Or may-
be it was a result of real compassion and humanity. But whatever the cause, the 1994 UN 
Human Development Report highlighted a new security agenda putting humans and HS 
at its core, rather than the previous focus on states, national security, and the international 
order. This partly focused on the immediate existential challenges that individuals face on 
a daily basis – poverty, ill health, violence and so on – and the provision of existential 
basic needs for people to survive. But it also went further by not just emphasising the 
threats to life itself, but also the quality of life that individuals should live; a life free from 
oppression with the ability to freely make positive life choices and attain their personal 
goals.  
 
Though NTS and HS are often conflated together, they should not be. The specific is-
sue areas that are identified as central to the HS agenda are all ones that fall under the 
broad heading of NTS. But the key difference is the reference point. In HS, it is very clear-
ly and specifically the individual that should be secure. In the broader NTS discourse, it 
can be the individual but it can also be the state or indeed the international system as a 
whole. Or put another way, NTS is all about thinking differently about what constitutes a 
security challenge, whereas HS is about thinking differently about what/who exactly it is 
that should be secured. 
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No Common Global NTS Agenda 
Differences remain over which Non Traditional issue should be prioritised. For example, 
mosquitoes are the single biggest transmitter of disease, but water is the root cause of 
millions of deaths either through providing a breeding ground for mosquitoes or as the 
source of diarrhoea – something that despite being easily treatable with the right drugs is 
the second biggest cause of death of infants in the world (after pneumonia). Yet the dis-
eases that have at times become the focus of international security debates (and some 
action) have been infectious diseases like AIDS, SARS and various forms of animal flus 
(avian, swine etc.) that have been identified as potential threats to people in developed 
Western states. There are also often very big differences of opinion over how best to deal 
with different challenges – an issue we will return to shortly. And some embraced this 
new security agenda quicker than others. Canada and Japan in particular took the lead in 
promoting the HS concept and embedding it in United Nations discourses. Nevertheless, 
the overall logic of the NTS agenda has become widely accepted. 
 
Seeking Common Ground for China and Europe 
Does this shift in thinking from traditional security agendas towards NTS and HS provide 
a basis for the collective provision of global public goods from China and Europe? The 
answer is a cautious and qualified yes. In China, a series of crises (including SARS, the 
2004 tsunami and the bird flu outbreak) resulted in a rethink of what constitutes the na-
ture of security, and what constitute the major security challenges for China. Furthermore, 
the nature of these and other challenges has resulted in a renewed focus on the im-
portance of international cooperation and collaboration, including in multilateral organi-
sations, to provide security. And in recent years, China has emerged as an important 
provider of aid and development for other developing states, and has become a provider 
and facilitator of HS for others in the process. In particular, Chinese loans have funded the 
construction (often by Chinese companies) of infrastructure projects across the developing 
world. China has also increased its spending on overseas agricultural projects and on 
health and education programmes (particularly in Africa) And here, we see great poten-
tial for collaboration with Europe, as there is already considerable interest and demand 
from European actors to partner with Chinese counterparts to provide development assis-
tance in third countries. For example, to work with China in the provision of medical 
facilities in the world’s least developed economies. Even though this overseas aid and 
development-related investment isn’t framed in China in terms of NTS, the fact that it 
chimes with European understandings of the need to combat NTS challenges can provide 
the basis for a Sino-European joint effort in providing global NTS security goods.  
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Differences Between Chinese and European Conceptions of NTS and HS 
But while there might be potential for a convergence of interests and agendas, considera-
ble differences between the two sides remain. Division on how best to deal with NTS 
challenges remains an important one with clear divisions over the extent to which other 
countries should interfere in the domestic politics of other sovereign states – a notion that 
China (among others) strongly rejects. This applies, for example, to divisions over the 
correctness (and indeed, efficacy) of military intervention to free individuals from the 
human insecurity that comes from the tyranny of authoritarian dictators. It also applies to 
divisions over the best way of promoting economic development, the correctness (and 
efficacy) of imposing solutions and models on others, and the linking of political condi-
tionalities to economic relations and aid. This means that security concepts which favour 
the human as a point of reference above the state, and think that protecting the individual 
is more important than preserving state sovereignty, collide with Chinese approaches. 
 
So can a conception of security that puts the individual human being at its centre – 
and importantly, all individual human beings no matter which state they live in – provide 
the basis for collaboration between China and Europe? Or does it instead pull them in 
different directions? There are two main reasons for leaning towards the latter more pes-
simistic position.  
 
First, the HS agenda is typically simplified to the goal of providing freedom from fear 
and freedom from want. As I have argued elsewhere in a paper that analyses Chinese 
language discussions of the nature of HS, whilst most Chinese analysts accept that these 
two freedoms represent the basic aspiration of all people, they argue that each country 
should develop their own HS agendas. These should be based on the own specific circum-
stances of each country, and nobody should try and impose an external political definition 
of HS, or agenda to achieve it, on any other country. In practice, this means an emphasis 
on freedom from want, and the provision of socio-economic security in China that does 
not sit easily with European positions. It also means that the security that each individual 
human being should have is not innate and universal, but rather specific to the state that 
each individual lives in.  
 
Second, and more fundamentally, we have already argued that NTS and HS should 
not simply be used interchangeably to refer to a range of new security challenges. NTS 
identifies the new challenges that we are facing, while HS clearly establishes a new refer-
ence point for considering what it is (or who it is) that needs to be secured. And although 
Chinese analysts do use the language of HS at times, when they do they – in contrast to 
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Western conceptions – tend to have the state, rather than the individual, as the reference 
point. Indeed, it is notable that the most commonly used Chinese term for Human Securi-
ty – renlei anquan 人类安全 – refers to the security of humankind, rather than the security 
of individual human beings.  
 
Conclusion 
It would be wrong to suggest that all European security agendas focus on the individual 
human, and that all Chinese ones focus on the state as the sole actor and referent point. 
Nor is all that Europe does beyond its borders based just on promoting HS for others, 
while China is simply interested in defending its own national core interests. Indeed, 
much of what is done in Europe to promote HS elsewhere is justified by explaining how it 
will contribute to national and human security for Europe and Europeans, rather than 
being simply acts of benevolence and philanthropy. As just one example, while there 
really is huge concern in Europe with the security of migrants fleeing war and chaos in the 
Middle East, the migrant crisis has also been generating debates over how best to secure 
Europe’s borders, and to ensure that increased migration does not cause domestic discon-
tent in individual European countries. Nevertheless, there does seem to be something of a 
gap when it comes to who or what the security reference point is or should be; the plan-
et/mankind, nations/states or individual human beings? And the answer to these ques-
tions has massive implications for how best (if at all) we can collectively construct a new 
security agenda and institutions that not only prevent insecurity, but which are also wide-
ly perceived to be legitimate. In particular, it seems difficult to find a legitimate and 
broadly accepted platform where ensuring the securing of individual human beings can 
or should be put above other security concerns. If common ground is to be found, the 
opportunity seems to lie in common positions on NTS that start from a focus on (sover-
eign) states as the key referent point, rather than a more ambitious and contested HS 
agenda.  
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Diplomacy in the Asian Geopolitical Landscape 
 
The Dual Face of China’s Rise  
Much has been talked and written about China’s rise. With its impressive and even his-
torically unprecedented economic rise over the past three decades, Beijing has been at-
tracting the world’s attention as an economy that is wielding a great impact on the world. 
China is now most definitely manifesting its global presence. Beijing’s expanding econom-
ic power has allowed it to extend its reach virtually everywhere – from mineral mines in 
Africa, to currency markets in the West, to oilfields in the Middle East, to agribusiness in 
Latin America, to the factories of East Asia. However, this economic rise, so impressive so 
far, is breeding fresh concerns worldwide as its growth now slows down, equity markets 
tumble and currency wobbles. Along with its economic rise, China’s military rise has also 
begun to ignite heated debates in both academic and policy communities, giving rise to 
concerns on the part of the West and its neighbours.  
 
Much less known, however, is its soft power rise, overshadowed by the hard side of 
the story. China has been launching its “charm offensive” (Kurlantzick 2008) at least since 
the 2000s. China’s public diplomacy is inextricably intertwined with its hard rise as it 
arouses much concern on the part of the West and its neighbouring countries. The empha-
sis on soft power is intended to ease the concern, with Beijing’s intention most clearly 
reflected in a series of official discourses (Lay/Lu 2012), in such an emphatic lexicon as 
“multipolarity”, “multilateralism”, “democratisation of international relations”, “peaceful 
rise”, “peaceful development”, “harmonious world” and most recently in the Xi Jinping 
era, “a new type of major power relations” and “China Dream”. Beijing’s foreign policy 
discourse has been disseminated worldwide, first of all through the Chinese media’s 
“going out” strategy to improve its image.  
 
Beijing’s “Charm Offensive” 
After the Beijing Olympics in 2008, China made a major commitment to creating its own 
media empire to compete with the established international media, launching a new Eng-
lish newspaper, the Global Times, and adding Arabic language programmes to China 
Central Television (CCTV) in 2009. Also in the same year, around 8.8 billion USD was 
pumped into the big four media outlets (CCTV, China Radio International, China Daily, 
and Xinhua News Agency) to support their global expansion (Shambaugh 2013: 227). 
Since launching its first 24-hour English channel CCTV International in 2000, CCTV now 
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broadcasts in six languages around the world. China Radio International, formerly Radio 
Beijing, broadcasts 392 hours of programming per day in 38 languages and maintains 27 
overseas bureaus. Versatile media outreach is an especially pronounced aspect of China’s 
public diplomacy in the United States. By 2013, CCTV was operating in English around 
the clock from a large broadcast facility in Washington, D.C. through its CNC World 
Internet channel, and also providing cell phone video and streaming video of its broad-
casts (Calder 2014). 
 
Another field of China’s charm offensive is its cultural diplomacy to disseminate Con-
fucian civilisation and values across the globe. Taking advantage of its unique culture and 
utilising a platform for cultural exchange, China has actively promoted cultural exchange 
programmes, festivals, movies, music, religious forums, sports, and tourism, as well as 
people-to-people and cultural exchanges, including educational cooperation, with the 
outside world since the 2000s. Most outstanding is the Confucius Institute project admin-
istered by the Hanban, or the Office of the Chinese Language Council International, with 
three main objectives – to teach Chinese, promote cultural exchange, and facilitate cultural 
activities. By the end of 2013, the Confucius Institute had a network of 1,086 affiliates – 440 
institutes and 646 classrooms – in 120 countries (Zaharna/Hubbert/Hartig 2014).8  
 
Knowledge diplomacy – utilising a country’s knowledge assets, including its historical 
experience, institutions and values repacked in knowledge forms for dissemination with a 
view to engaging foreign publics – is yet another realm of China’s public diplomacy. 
China’s developmental experience, or so-called “Beijing Consensus,” is considered by 
many developing countries as an alternative political and economic model to the Wash-
ington Consensus. Although China does not seem to promote its development experience 
to the height of a consensus, the fact that the Chinese economy is one of the most powerful 
and will probably very soon be the biggest economy in the world attracts more people to 
its developmental experience, if not model.  
 
Beijing appears to have strong enthusiasm for a new political and economic order in 
Asia as reiterated in its official parlance – “being the responsible great nation”, “building 
friendship and partnership with neighbouring countries”, “good-neighbourliness”, “stabi-
lised neighbour”, “rich neighbour”, and “new Asia security concept”. As part of so-called 
“host diplomacy”, Beijing is utilising multilateral forums as intellectual venues to push 
these ideas. The Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), inaugurated in 2001 as a high-end platform 
                                               
8 http://english.hanban.org.  
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for dialogues among leaders of governments, industrial, business, and academic circles in 
Asia, is a typical example of China’s host diplomacy for regional cooperation. The Net-
work of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT), officially recognised at the ASEAN+3 summit 
meeting, is another example of ushering in regional institutional design. In this vein, more 
recently, the One Belt, One Road initiative is projected as a global and regional public 
good since Beijing claims it could provide infrastructural connectivity for developing 
countries along the road and belt, along with potential opportunities for common prosper-
ity (Yinbin 2015).9  
 
Amidst its dual rise, although it wants to see its soft power parallel to its hard power, 
Beijing still feels a certain deficiency of soft power (Shambaugh 2013). “While China’s 
economic prowess impresses much of the world, its authoritarian political system and 
mercantilist business practices tarnish its reputation.” (Shambaugh 2015: 99) But the real 
problem appears to be not a deficiency between hard and soft power, but rather the in-
strumentality of the latter for the former, which fundamentally derives from the dual, split 
identity of China – an aspiring great power and a low-profile developing country that 
seeks to avoid conflict with the United States and its allies. The instrumentality, or the 
subservience of soft power to hard power, may transform its charm offensive simply into 
another type of “hard power in a velvet glove.” (Van Herpen 2015) This is particularly so 
in Asia, where China is at the centre of “the return of geopolitics” (Mead 2014), challeng-
ing the existing international order established for the past seven decades by the United 
States’ initiatives in the region. Regardless of its intention, Beijing’s external behaviour 
evokes some dubious apprehensions even about its charm offensive in today’s geopoliti-
cal context. This is the case in at least three aspects.  
 
History, Geopolitics and China’s Growing Assertiveness 
History shows that a nation’s economic rise eventually leads to military rise, particularly 
in the context of geo-strategic competition and contentions between great powers. A study 
carried out by the Harvard Belfer Centre confirms the power transition theory, finding 
that in twelve out of sixteen cases over the past 500 years, in which there was a rapid shift 
in the relative power of a rising nation that threatened to displace a dominant state, the 
result was war.10 In each case of power shift, a nation’s economic rise invariably preceded 
                                               
9 Also available at http://charhar.china.org.cn/node_7230299.htm.  
10 Graham Allison (2015): The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?, The Atlantic 
(September 24). See also 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25760/thucydides_trap_project.html.  
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its military rise and challenge to a dominant power. In Asia in particular, Japan’s rapid 
economic rise since the Meiji restoration led to war with China in 1894-1895 and with 
Russia in 1904-1905 and eventually, the Pacific War.  
 
Traditional functionalists would argue to the contrary that economic interdependence 
would pave the way to political and security cooperation. This may not necessarily be the 
case, however. The growing economic interdependence between Washington and Beijing 
has not prevented the strategic rivalry between the two great powers. In the case of Japan, 
economic inter-connectedness did not prevent the deterioration of Tokyo-Beijing relations 
over the past decade (Smith 2015). Although China was its largest trading partner, Vi-
etnam did not hesitate to reveal its animosity against China in the anti-China riots amidst 
the conflict over the South China Sea and, eventually, align itself with its old arch-enemy, 
the United States. Historical and contemporary events forcefully tell us that security pre-
vails over economy. This is more so when classical geopolitics is back on the scene. 
 
This century, the spectre of the old geopolitics is wriggling out of Pandora’s Box. The 
Middle East is ablaze from Iraq to Libya, Yemen and Syria, each becoming the breeding 
ground for violent extremism and terrorism as symbolised by the so-called Islamic State. 
In Eastern Europe, tension between Russia on the one hand and the United States and its 
European allies on the other with regard to Ukraine and the Missile Defence system re-
mains unabated, leaving many to wonder whether a new Cold War has returned. In Asia, 
a rising China faced the United States’ “rebalancing” towards the region under the Obama 
administration, and now would encounter the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” of the Trump ad-
ministration. Japan’s recent march towards a “normal state” that “can wage a war” makes 
the geopolitical game in this part of the world even more complicated. Territorial disputes 
and freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas are increasingly taking on a 
dimension of strategic rivalry between the countries in the region. More seriously, North 
Korea’s continued nuclear tests and provocations are perceived as a common security 
threat causing instability in the region. The spectre of the old-style geopolitics of the late 
19th and early 20th centuries seems to be re-emerging.  
 
The geopolitical landscape indeed breeds a conventional security dilemma, in which 
miscalculations and uncertainty about intentions could easily escalate into dismal con-
flicts. In Northeast Asia, the historical question that has long stained and strained rela-
tionships between the nations of the region remains unabated. The agony of the collective 
national memories of modern Northeast Asian history since the 19th century has been 
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continually reproduced and rekindled in each of the countries of the region in the form of 
retrospective and reactive nationalism, adding fuel to the geopolitical flames.  
 
China’s growingly assertive behaviour is unmistakably discernible in its Asia policy, 
at least since the 2008 financial crisis and the Beijing Olympics. Particularly notable are its 
moves in the East and South China Seas, territorial claims that Beijing lists among its “core 
interests.” In 2013 China unilaterally declared a China Air Defence Identification Zone 
(CADIZ), which contains the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and South Korean airspace north of 
Yiedo and west of Jeju Island. In the South China Sea, China has been building frenetical-
ly, turning rocks and reefs into islands. Not only China, but also countries such as Taiwan, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have built artificial islands and laid territorial 
claims, but China is considered particularly threatening simply because it is a rising great 
power. Seen through the recent changes in its naval strategy and doctrine as well as its 
naval build-up, Beijing unmistakably appears to be steadily expanding its presence until 
its dominance of the sea becomes an incontestable fact, challenging 70 years of American 
naval supremacy in the Western Pacific.11 In a report published in 2016, the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies, a renowned Washington-based think tank, projected 
that by 2030, on current trends, “the South China sea will be virtually a Chinese lake, as 
the Caribbean or Gulf of Mexico is for the United States today.”(CSIS 2016)  
 
Another case in point is Beijing’s equivocal attitudes toward Pyongyang, and its nu-
clear and missile provocations in particular. China makes clear that it sees the collapse of 
North Korea’s brutal regime as a greater threat than its nuclear weapons programme. 
Beijing still weighs up the value of North Korea between being a strategic asset that acts as 
a buffer state in the increasing strategic rivalry with the United States and a liability in 
international society that tarnishes Beijing’s reputation as a responsible great power. In a 
meeting between John Kerry and the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in January 2015, 
for instance, Wang resisted suggestions that Chinese leaders could do much more to pun-
ish North Korea for its latest test of a nuclear bomb, citing among other things the harm 
that imposing sanctions might cause to Chinese companies. Although Beijing eventually 
joined the UN Security Council Resolution 2270, the multilateral sanction against Pyong-
yang’s nuclear provocation in 2015, it still remains to be seen whether Beijing will once 
again turn into a black knight for the Pyongyang regime.  
                                               
11 See, for example, Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014) and Eric Heginbotham, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: 
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 
2015). 
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Great power discount in winning the hearts and minds of foreign publics  
China’s efforts at public diplomacy in several directions could be futile. Claims already 
abound that China is walking down the same path towards empire in different parts of 
the world as did the former Western powers a century ago. A notable difference is that the 
nature of geopolitical competition is now evolving from war over territory to a ‘tug-of-
war’ over infrastructures and connectivity across the globe. An important way this com-
petitive connectivity is taking place is through infrastructure alliances. Beijing claims that 
its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has elevated infrastructure to the status of a global good 
on a par with America’s provision of security (Khanna 2016). 
 
Even its charm offensive with a benign intention could arouse suspicion and fear of 
domination on the part of smaller nations. This is not so much because of Beijing’s malign 
hegemonic intention as a great power discount: regardless of its intention, the interna-
tional society will be suspicious that Beijing will eventually unveil its hegemonic clout. 
Beijing’s behaviour in the security realm only confirms this suspicion. Global public goods 
may be perceived by others as private goods to enhance China’s geostrategic national 
interests even at the expense of others’ interests. This is the reason why China’s argument 
on global public goods in particular, and public diplomacy in general, is struggling to gain 
traction. So much more is needed if China is to convince the rest of the world, and its 
Asian neighbours in particular.  
 
China appears to have a dual identity as a great power and a developing country. In 
the struggle to strike a balance between the two, China is still juggling its low profile 
policy with its emerging role of a global power. Its charm offensive is part of its strategy 
of managing its rise on the world stage. In this endeavour, Beijing’s public diplomacy 
could be a crucial linchpin for integrating this dual identity. Or, it could be another type of 
hard power in a velvet glove that veils its aspirations to be a great power. The more asser-
tive Beijing’s external behaviour on the geopolitical horizon, the more of a great power 
discount it will face in winning the hearts and minds of foreign publics. The burden falls 
on China’s shoulders to narrow the gap between hard and soft power by lessening the 
instrumentality of soft power for its hard power rise.  
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Sheng Ding: Promoting Chinese Culture in China’s Public Diplomacy 
 
“Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and  
creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national 
strength.… Chinese culture has been an unfailing driving force for the Chinese nation to 
keep its unity and make progress from generation to generation… We will further publi-
cise the fine traditions of Chinese culture and use modern means of science and tech-
nology to exploit the rich resources of our national culture… We will also strengthen in-
ternational cultural exchanges to draw on the fine achievements of foreign cultures and 
enhance the influence of Chinese culture worldwide.”12 
 
Traditional analyses foretell that the coming of a new great power portends a threat to 
the international system, and its rise often leads to war, mainly because it often uses coer-
cive power to change the international order to suit its expanding national interests. As a 
rising power, the authoritarian China’s foreign policy orientations are always under the 
scrutiny of the other great powers as well as its Asian neighbours. While it has become an 
increasingly socialised state that is willing to embrace and shape the norms in regional 
and global affairs, China’s cautious and sometimes disingenuous participations in global 
governance on some politically sensitive issues have not boded well for the country’s 
desired national image as “a responsible great power”. For example, Beijing has often 
shown its aloofness towards human rights problems in other countries, provided political 
support for repressive regimes, and made inadequate responses to some international 
crises such as the Darfur genocide and the North Korean nuclear crisis. Against this back-
drop, the rising China has hardly been considered a “responsible stakeholder” in the fast-
growing global governance of the post-Cold War era. The unpredictability and challenge 
imposed by China to global governance are mainly due to the country’s failure to accept 
its leadership roles proportionate to its growing national power and increasing interna-
tional status. 
 
Furthermore, in the post-Cold War world, economic globalisation, democratisation, 
and the spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) have greatly deep-
ened global interdependence, universalised certain values like democracy and human 
rights, and expanded the flow of information and talent. Many call this period the global 
                                               
12 In his report delivered at the 17th Chinese Communist Party National Congress, the former Chinese 
President Hu Jintao called for promoting the Chinese culture in China’s public diplomacy. See his report 
“Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in 
Building a Moderately Prosperous Society”, 15 October 2007. 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm. 
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information age, in which public diplomacy has become an increasingly important policy 
approach in world affairs. According to Peter Van Ham, globalisation and the media 
revolution have made each state highly attentive to its image, reputation and attitudes 
that are considered part of a state’s brand (van Ham 2001). Indeed, almost all state gov-
ernments have actively developed their public diplomacy resources and implemented 
new policy initiatives in order to deal with the influence of public attitudes on the for-
mation and execution of their foreign policies.13 Many China observers, including Joshua 
Cooper Ramo, believe that China’s most important strategic issues and policy challenges 
as diverse as sustaining economic growth and the threat of Taiwanese independence have 
at their root a shared connection to its national image. In this milieu, public diplomacy is 
vital to China’s national image management and has become one of the strategic priorities 
of Beijing’s policymakers (Cooper Ramo 2007). Since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, 
Beijing has made great efforts to pursue the cultivation of its desired national image in 
other countries and promote the interaction of private groups and interests in China with 
those of other countries.  
 
Beijing as a showcase for endeavouring to conduct its public diplomacy in the global 
information age has generated a dilemma. On the one hand, conventional wisdom pre-
dicts that globalisation and the information revolution pose potent threats to the authori-
tarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), especially its capabilities in terms of 
information control. On the other hand, many people believe that Beijing will be able to 
wield its soft power and strengthen its international broadcasting capacity through such 
effective public diplomacy approaches as broadening its foreign cultural exchange and 
utilising ICT in its external publicity campaigns. For example, the Chinese government 
has hired top brand consultants and policy strategists, and adopted various new policy 
initiatives in order to improve its international image, and advance its policy agenda 
worldwide. Among many new policy initiatives and approaches, the Chinese government 
has particularly stepped up its continuous campaigns to promote Chinese culture to for-
eign publics.  
 
  
                                               
13 Edmund A. Gullion, one of the earliest scholars in the study of public diplomacy, coined and defined 
the term public diplomacy in 1965. See http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/diplomacy.  
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China‘s Cultural Diplomacy Strategy 
In his report delivered at the 17th CCP National Congress, the former Chinese President 
Hu Jintao claimed that Chinese culture not only influences various aspects of people’s 
lives and plays a vital part in the country’s economic and social development, but also has 
direct impacts on China’s foreign relations and helps achieve important foreign policy 
goals. Seeking to build the desired national image and inspire positive international pub-
lic opinion, the Chinese government has patiently and skilfully implemented its cultural 
diplomacy. China’s cultural diplomacy strategy was defined by its former Minister of 
Culture Sun Jiazheng as follows: “a new mechanism for China’s outward culture ex-
change has come into being, with the Chinese government playing a major role, social 
organisations playing supplementary roles”.14 Under this new mechanism, the Chinese 
government has implemented many cultural initiatives such as sponsoring student ex-
change programmes between China and other countries, encouraging inbound and out-
bound tourism, organising grand cultural events in other countries, and so on. In a na-
tional meeting on external publicity held in January 2011, Wang Chen, the former czar of 
China’s public diplomacy (who served as Director of the Information Office of the State 
Council and the International Communication Office of the CCP Central Committee) 
vowed to enhance the nation’s cultural soft power, build a friendly international envi-
ronment of public opinion, and promote China’s favoured image.15 
 
As China continues its rapid economic development and expands its share of world 
trade, the value of the Chinese language has been on the rise. More than 2,300 universities 
in some 100 countries are offering Chinese courses as part of their curriculums. In South 
Korea, Japan, France, as well as other countries, Chinese has become the fastest-growing 
foreign language in high schools. The global popularity of Chinese has not gone unno-
ticed by Beijing. Recognising the importance of its culture and language in enhancing the 
country’s public diplomacy, the Chinese government has introduced a series of aggressive 
measures to promote the study of and research into Chinese language and culture around 
the world. Beijing has sought to tether its public diplomacy campaigns to the global popu-
larity of Chinese language and culture. The National Office for Teaching Chinese as a 
Foreign Language, Hanban, was established in 1987 to coordinate China’s efforts to pro-
mote Chinese language and culture around the world. Hanban’s two most important 
                                               
14 See “Chinese Minister of Culture on ‘Chinese Culture Year in France’”, Xinhua News Agency, 21 Febru-
ary 2004. Available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/88063.htm. 
15 See “National Working Conference on External Publicity Has Deployed External Publicity Work this 
Year”, Xinhua News Agency, 5 January 2010. Available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-
01/05/content_1503803.htm.  
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programmes are the Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Confucius Classrooms (CCs). Beijing 
aims to make significant headway in entering foreign education institutions, with the CIs 
targeting foreign universities and colleges and the CCs targeting secondary and even 
primary schools. As of the end of 2015, there were about 500 CIs and 1,000 CCs around the 
world. According to the data posted on Hanban’s official website, the two largest concen-
tration regions of CIs and CCs are Europe (159 CIs and 257 CCs) and the Americas (157 
CIs and 544 CCs).16 The mission of these institutions is to strengthen understanding,  
opportunities and bonds between individuals, enterprises, communities and institutions 
in host countries and China.17 To a great extent, the spread of CIs and CCs have forged 
strategic alliances with businesses, industries, governments, and other institutions with an 
interest in closer and more productive ties with China. They have unabashedly served as a 
global-local keystone for China’s cultural diplomacy.  
 
The Role of the Diaspora 
Along with these CIs and CCs, the 51-million-strong Chinese diaspora also serves as a 
vital platform for promoting Chinese culture in China’s public diplomacy. Throughout its 
5,000-year history, China’s national identity has always been so strong and unique that 
the Chinese people named its own country the “Middle Kingdom”, which references the 
centrality of China to the world system. Since many Chinese diasporas possess a sojourner 
mentality and lack a sense of permanence in their adopted countries, they cherish their 
various connections with China, as well as being recognised by their cultural motherland. 
As Wei-ming Tu pointed out, “the ubiquitous presence of the Chinese state—its awe-
inspiring physical size, its long history, and the numerical weight of its population—
continues to loom large in the psychocultural constructs of diaspora Chinese.” (Wei-ming 
Tu 1994: 18) In the global information age, Chinese cultural and ethnic identities seem to 
be growing stronger as certain attributes of the Westphalian state system fall away reveal-
ing a post-modern world of global-local identities. More importantly, as China strength-
ens its international status through foreign economic cooperation, transnational cultural 
exchanges, and productive and inventive diplomacy, it is reasonable to expect more over-
seas Chinese to re-embrace their cultural identities and seek to build even tighter bonds 
with their cultural motherland. Against this backdrop, it has become a highly effective 
approach for Beijing to engage and mobilise the 51-million Chinese diaspora in its cultural 
diplomacy. 
                                               
16 The data about the distribution of CIs and CCs are collected from Hanban’s official website. Available 
from http://www.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_10961.htm [Accessed 10 January 2016]. 
17 See the mission statement posted on the website of Western Australia University’s Confucius Institute 
located at http://www.confuciusinstitute.uwa.edu.au/about/mission/. 
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The overseas Chinese who live in the culturally distanced regions particularly feel the 
pull of China’s cultural diplomacy when they speak the Chinese language, identify them-
selves as ethnic Chinese, learn popular Chinese culture, and pass on Chinese traditions to 
their descendants. China’s efforts to strengthen its international education have paid off in 
public diplomacy with overseas Chinese. For example, the number of foreign students 
who studied in China rose to 328,000 in 2012, compared to 290,000 in 2011. Among these 
foreign students, many are ethnic Chinese students, that is to say the offspring of Chinese 
nationals who emigrated abroad. This new generation of Chinese descendants aims to 
learn more about Chinese culture and language to improve their career prospects and 
maintain their transnational cultural identities. In addition, the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Office and its subordinates at all levels of government have collaborated with various 
overseas Chinese communal organisations to organise Chinese Origin Root Search Trips 
for younger overseas Chinese. The Guangdong and Fujian provinces as well as some 
metropolitan cities like Beijing and Shanghai are popular destinations for those root-
searching trips. As an important platform of China’s cultural diplomacy in the global 
information age, the Chinese diaspora has helped Beijing to promote the Chinese culture 
in its public diplomacy and improve China’s national image around the world.  
 
China has a Long Journey Ahead 
China’s more than four decades-long process of reform and opening-up has transformed 
the country from a reclusive hermit in the Western-dominated international system to the 
keystone of Asia-Pacific’s globalisation processes. With China rising, it behoves a Chinese 
government enjoying considerable international influence to embrace international norms 
and participate in global governance. The Chinese government has always claimed that 
China will become a “peaceful and responsible great power” as the nation rises. Some 
China observers believe that Beijing has demonstrated increasing willingness to contri-
bute to the international public good, including economic stability and growth, non-
proliferation, and regional security. However, many doubt that an increasingly powerful, 
nationalistic, and authoritarian China will adhere to international norms and fully partici-
pate in global governance.  
 
Although the Chinese government has made some progress in projecting a “new” 
China to foreign publics since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, China’s public diploma-
cy in the global information age still faces some hurdles arising from its lack of political 
credibility and poor human rights record. In particular, China’s new cultural diplomacy 
campaigns are unlikely to build its favoured national image. Without adequate political 
plurality, government accountability and the rule of law, things that are only established 
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by democratic political reform, China’s new cultural diplomacy campaigns will only 
become rhetorical propaganda that will often be misconstrued by other countries and risk 
engendering conflict. For example, the international media coverage on China’s foreign 
policy behaviours and its human rights issues have become increasingly intense in recent 
years. China’s cultural diplomacy campaigns have been overshadowed by its continuous 
military build-up and growing assertiveness in handling territorial disputes with its Asian 
neighbours. From alleged Beijing-sponsored cyber attacks on Western corporations to 
blackmailing other governments to prevent them attending the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize 
Ceremony to the infamous Great Firewall of China, Beijing’s sensitivity to and recalci-
trance about its human rights records has raised further doubts about the effectiveness of 
China’s cultural diplomacy. In North America and Europe, a few education institutions 
such as the University of Chicago, Penn State University, and Stockholm University have 
already ended their relationships with the Confucius Institute over their concerns about 
academic freedom, etc. In this milieu, the Chinese government will have a long journey 
ahead if it is to succeed in conducting its public diplomacy and promote Chinese culture 
around the world. 
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Susan Perry: Gender as a Global Public Good in China 
 
When we think of global public goods, we think of air, water, climate or outer space, but 
we rarely include gender equality on the list. Nonetheless, our ability to guarantee a via-
ble future for our environment pivots on the empowerment of women to act as full part-
ners in the protection and sustainability of our global surroundings.18 Global Public Goods 
(GPG) are resources that can be consumed by one individual (or country) without dimin-
ishing availability of the good to another, and are nonexclusionary in that no individual 
(or country) can be barred from GPG benefits (International Task Force on Global Public 
Goods 2006). Initial discussion of GPGs skimmed over the issue of gender equality, before 
full consideration of the collective, transboundary impact of women on GPGs was 
acknowledged in research and academic circles (Blackden 2009). Today, most internation-
al institutions apply a gender equality perspective to the discussion of all global public 
goods, rather than include gender equality as a stand-alone item on their definitive list of 
GPGs. This is remarkably convenient for both gender equality advocates and their oppo-
nents, as this policy not only highlights the seminal importance of women as full partners 
in the protection and sustainability of GPGs, but also diffuses the allocation of resources 
in such a way as to make gender an add-on, rather than a core objective of international 
and national policy-making. 
 
China, with its historic commitment to gender equality since 1949, its acknowledged 
role as a global polluter, and its more than 750 million female citizens represents a key 
player in any discussion of gender equality and GPGs. The current Chinese government 
fully supports gender equality on paper and has made several symbolic gestures, such as 
the donation of 10 million US Dollars to UN Women in 2015, but it is not clear whether the 
government considers gender equality as a full-fledged GPG, or an add-on policy choice 
with interesting potential. This paper will explore (1) the historic foundations for gender 
equality in contemporary China, (2) the slow pace of equality implementation in the polit-
ical and economic spheres, (3) current challenges in signalling China’s commitment to 
gender equality, and (4) recommendations to European and Chinese actors hoping to 
advance China’s commitment to gender equality within the international human rights 
treaty framework. 
 
  
                                               
18 While the final text of the Paris Agreement for the COP21 mentions “gender” only five times, UNEP. 
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Historic Foundations 
With the modernisation of Chinese society and the 1949 Communist Liberation, women 
moved out of the home and into farming and factory production, and into the profession-
al spheres traditionally reserved for men. Yet, like their female counterparts the world 
over, Chinese women have continued to face subtle and overt forms of discrimination 
(Stacey 1983; Wolf 1985; Honig and Hershatter 1988; Chan et al. 1998). Today, governmen-
tal and quasi-non-governmental associations encourage rural and urban women alike to 
defend themselves, promote their interests and, above all, define a new space for them-
selves within the parameters of a single party state. Contrary to official statements claim-
ing the importance of bettering the status of women and reducing gender inequalities, 
however, the improvement of women’s lives by governments and development agencies 
remains an underfunded endeavour. The State Council, China’s executive body, coordi-
nates gender policy through the National Working Committee on Children and Women, 
rather than through a designated ministry of women’s affairs. The grouping of children 
and women together suggests that women are to be treated as minors, rather than fully 
fledged adults, an echo of traditional cultural paradigms. Moreover, the Party-State has 
always been ambivalent about the potential of Chinese women to organise and challenge 
government policy (Perry 2000). 
 
The Chinese government published a White Paper in September 2015 on gender 
equality and women’s development that focuses on the steady statistical progress made 
by women in health, education, political representation, legal protection and environmen-
tal sustainability in China. Empirically, there is no question that China has made remark-
able strides over the past 65 years in overcoming embedded discrimination against wom-
en in all spheres of public and private life. Because the White Paper includes no negative 
statistical information, however, it can be assumed that the publication was written in 
response to a growing chorus of criticism levelled at the government by Chinese citizens, 
via social media, following the arrest of five prominent feminists in April 2015. The White 
Paper does recognise that: 
 
“China is highly aware that, as a developing country with the world’s largest population, 
and restricted by its limited level of economic and social development, it will continue 
to be confronted with new situations and problems in its efforts to promote women’s 
development. There is still a long way to go to achieve gender equality in China, and ar-
duous tasks remain to be tackled.” (White Paper 2015: 13) 
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Most recent scholarship on gender equality in China points to a decline in the position 
of women in Chinese society during what is called the post-socialist era (1992-2015). This 
pattern may be traced to China's post-socialist economy and to a long-existing cultural 
tradition that places a premium on harmony and group solidarity (Wang 2007).  
 
Post-socialist Implementation of Gender Inequality 
Implementation of gender equality became less of a government priority under market 
socialism. Despite China’s Revised Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests 
(2005), which provides an expansive framework for gender equality, a study of on-budget 
capital expenditure in China shows that the social sectors received only a small proportion 
of the wealth generated under the new economy, less than 10 per cent (Mei and Wang 
2006, 32). As inequalities of all sorts resurged under the “state capitalist economy” (Lardy 
2013), the All-China Women’s Federation found itself in the unprecedented position of 
challenging its boss, the Chinese Communist Party, to make good on its commitment to 
gender equality. The Federation, one of China’s traditional “mass organisations” designed 
to serve as a conduit for Party-State directives aimed at the grassroots level, has been 
remarkably successful in making women’s voices heard at the upper echelons of power. 
Still viewed as more apolitical than the All-China Federation of Trade Unions or the 
Communist Youth League of China, the All-China Women’s Federation has been especial-
ly vigilant in promoting legal recourse for female members that face gender discrimina-
tion. The fourth (and last) World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 galvanised 
the sleepy women’s federation into what activists have referred to as a two-headed drag-
on, fiercely supporting unpopular Party-State policies such as the former One-Child cam-
paign,19 while challenging the Party-State on violence against women (which impacts one 
fourth of the Federation’s members)20 or rampant discrimination in employment (Perry 
2000; Otis 2011; Kuhn and Shen 2012; Angeloff and Lieber 2012). 
 
Discourse and Practice Under the Xi Jinping Administration 
The debate on gender equality has heated up since 2008, when the global recession trig-
gered rising unemployment in China that has disproportionately impacted women (Golub 
2016). The Women’s Media Monitoring Network provided evidence of active admissions 
discrimination at sixty-six universities across China, with a lower required score for men 
                                               
19 The Chinese government announced in 2013 that it would consider relaxing its decades-old One-Child 
policy in order to reverse demographic trends, and the first provincial and municipal announcements 
began in 2014. The official legislative adjustment for the entire country came into force on January 1, 
2016. See: http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/2015-12/21/content_22764063.htm.  
20 China’s first Anti-Domestic Violence Law was scheduled to come into effect in March 2016. 
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than for women at 13 Chinese universities (WMMN 2014). Once these women graduated 
from university, a 2011 survey by the All China Women’s Federation indicated that nearly 
92 per cent of female college graduates had experienced gender discrimination when 
seeking work (ACWF 2011). In 2014, a private tutoring firm settled with a Beijing female 
graduate who sued the company for gender discrimination in hiring practices, a first for 
China. For those who never make it past high school, a 2013 study of 134 Guangdong 
female factory workers demonstrated that 70 per cent experienced regular sexual harass-
ment on the job, and for 15 per cent the harassment was so serious that they had no option 
but to quit (Sunflower Women Workers Centre 2013). And in the higher political and 
economic echelons, less than 25 per cent of Chinese Communist Party members were 
female (Gender Study Network 2015) and less than 6 per cent of general managers of 
companies publicly traded on China’s A-share stock markets – 115 individuals altogether 
– were women in 2015 (China Accounting 2015). The one area where women appear to be 
making equal strides with men is in cyberspace, where female entrepreneurs account for 
55 per cent of entrepreneurs (White Paper 2015: 4) and “sheeconomy” incubators for 
women e-entrepreneurs receive a good deal of media attention (Women of China 2015). 
 
These figures point to a persistent gap overall between discourse and practice in the 
PRC. As in most countries, the gender gap is due to chronic underfunding of women’s 
rights protection and enduring under-representation in political and economic leadership 
circles. While cyberspace offers a new domain in which women appear able to compete 
with men on an equal footing, e-entrepreneurship is to a great extent virtual until the first 
public stock offering; once a company is listed on a stock exchange, corporate leadership 
becomes predominantly masculine worldwide. 
 
Potential for Gender as a GPG in China 
One of the PRC’s first acts as an international player in 1980 was to sign and ratify the 
newly promulgated UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). Like most societies, however, China continues to struggle 
with culturally embedded gender discrimination, despite a remarkable array of legislative 
tools and campaigns designed to protect women’s rights. China recently launched the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI), an exceptional opportunity for the government to integrate a 
vibrant gender component in all project planning and funding, and to become a world 
leader in promoting gender as a GPG. According to Chinese scholars, the BRI includes 
enhanced policy coordination across the Asian continent, financial integration, trade liber-
alisation, and people-to-people connectivity, but does not yet have an integrated gender 
component (Wang and Yao 2015). The current paradigm that treats gender as a GPG add-
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on defeats the non-derogable anti-discrimination doctrine that is at the core of inter-
national law and China’s obligations under the CEDAW (CEDAW, article 2). 
 
China must espouse gender as an integral component of policymaking, rather than an 
afterthought. Given the ambitious geographic reach of the Belt and Road project, the 
integration of gender as a policy pivot would firmly place women’s potential at the heart, 
rather than the periphery of the BRI. In this way, China would take the lead in promoting 
gender as a fully operational GPG, rather than as a policy postscript. 
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Ines Sieckmann: Building Sino-European Cultural Relations: Background and  
Challenges 
 
With regard to pressing global social and environmental challenges, it becomes inevitable 
for both China and Europe as important global players to seek common ground and ways 
for effective sustainable co-operation. But relations between Europe and China are com-
plex and remain open to setbacks, tensions and misunderstandings. Gottwald et al. (2010: 
29) stress that Europe and China were “…operating from mutually exclusive expecta-
tions“ based on substantial systemic and definitional differences. There is no alternative to 
dialogue in order to find common ground. Even in a seemingly softer policy field such as 
cultural relations, the difficulty remains of weighing up each other’s tolerance threshold, 
negotiating reasonable limits and reacting to each other’s crossing a line. This chapter 
looks into challenges and framework conditions of cultural relations between Europe and 
China.  
 
Culture as a Global Public Good (GPG) 
 
"(P)eople’s well-being does not depend only on the provision of public goods by nation-
al governments, but increasingly depends on the provision of global public goods that 
only international cooperation can secure. [...]securing their provision is central for 
promoting the well-being of individuals in today’s globalized world."  
(Deneulin/Townsend 2006: 3) 
 
Cultural relations can serve the provision of culture as a GPG, and can at the same time 
help create foundations of understanding that facilitate international co-operation for 
other GPGs by fostering respect for diversity and a knowledge of cultural differences and 
similarities. 
 
Culture as a GPG can refer to characteristics or goods of specific cultures and their in-
trinsic value for all humankind (as in world cultural heritage). It underscores the value of 
culture and cultural diversity and includes aspects of culture such as specific values that 
are increasingly globally shared. In a seminal publication of Kaul et al. on Global Public 
Goods, Serageldin (1999) points out that  
 
"(a)s an essential part of humanity, culture is an end in itself. One of the least under-
stood but most essential aspects of cultural identity is its contribution to a society’s abil-
ity to promote self-esteem and empowerment for everyone..." (Serageldin 1999: 240)  
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But as the protection of (often traditional) culture can collide with other GPGs such as 
gender equality and other human rights, he holds that “…a balance should be struck 
between the defence of particular traditions and other global public goods” and stresses 
an approach to culture that “(...) encourages diversity, creates a space of freedom in each 
society for the minority expression and the contrarian view and promotes inclusion and 
social cohesion.” (Serageldin 1999: 240f.)  
 
Often, authoritarian regimes such as the Chinese value social cohesion and “harmony” 
more than diversity; freedom of critical or contrarian views is regarded as a threat to 
legitimacy. In this respect, different outlooks between Europe and China collide and com-
plicate cultural relations.  
 
Finding an Equal Footing 
Obviously, the rise of China as an emerging giant poses important questions of status in 
the changing international system. In reaction to this shift, President Xi Jinping propagates 
the concept of the “Chinese Dream“ of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation“, a 
dream of reacquiring previous grandeur after over a “century of humiliation“ by colonial 
powers (i. e. Wang 2013). China’s aiming for new grandeur is being eyed by many with an 
uneasy feeling. And in the eyes of some Chinese observers the US and Europe begrudge 
China its rise. In China, Europeans are often perceived as arrogant (see Chaban in this 
volume) and “Old Europe“ as in decline. Still, China started seeking a stronger relation-
ship with the EU motivated by the hope to contain US unilateralism and dominance. 
“China’s view is that Europe offers a ‘bridge‘ for China to enter a world system, dominat-
ed by the US, on its own terms.“ (Clegg 2009:132) Europeans are not only seen as far less 
concerned with the threat of China’s hard power compared to the US but – as a “Civilian 
Power“ – “(l)acking the hegemonic reach and ambition of the US, the EU is regarded as 
more prepared to treat China as an equal.“ (Clegg 2009: 132). And for China, this – treat-
ing China as an equal partner – is key in the relationship with Europe, including China’s 
former colonial powers.  
 
In general, EU-China relations are deepening, but frictions persist. Europe and China 
seem to be “…operating from mutually exclusive expectations“. The EU is projecting itself 
as a “Normative Power“ or norm exporter, emphasising – though to varying degrees – a 
value-based foreign policy. Its liberal norms represent an important building block of 
shared identity. In China’s view, on the contrary, multilateralism should be based on 
“…equality and respect for sovereignty and on common interests rather than shared val-
ues and ideologies.“ (Clegg 2009: 125) It should hence be non-interventionist or non-
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interfering.21 Normative differences and the search for a dialogue on an equal footing also 
pervade cultural relations between Europe and China.  
 
Approaches to Culture in the EU and China 
Culture is often perceived as a soft issue in international relations and research focuses 
much more on “harder“ issues in Sino-European relations (Staines 2012).22 Also, cultural 
relations are not considered a priority in EU-China relations, and are mainly realised on 
bilateral terms (Ferrero-Waldner on behalf of the EU Commission 02.02.2006).  
 
Cultural relations are often understood as a powerful means for bridge-building be-
tween countries or regions. Still, culture, as an identity issue, can become a politically 
sensitive apple of discord. As pointed out by Bátora (2011), culture can play an ambiguous 
role in politics: It can be used for boundary building and “othering“ (Neumann 2011) – i. 
e. delineating an out-group in order to strengthen the we-ness of the in-group – as well as 
for boundary transcendence and integration. This can be used domestically to legitimate 
one’s rule. Those aspects of politicisation shape and complicate cultural relations between 
Europe and China.  
 
“Socialist Cultural Superpower” and a “Superior European High Culture” 
With view to culture, both China and the EU proudly look back on thousands of years of 
cultural heritage. China, the “Middle Kingdom”, thought of itself for a long time as the 
centre of the world – just like Europe. Nowadays, sentiments of inferiority from a “centu-
ry of humiliations“ and a recent history as a poor developing country still exist, but a 
“new assertiveness“ of China has recently been noted. Shambaugh (2013: 208, see also 
Shambaugh in this volume) notes, the Chinese government recently even called for estab-
lishing a “socialist cultural superpower“.23   
 
Europe is said to often come along with a traditional ethnocentric “superiority com-
plex“ (Ringmar 2011), behaving like an exclusive club (Bátora/Mokre 2009) and assuming 
                                               
21 At the same time, China itself has been known for ideological foreign policy, posing as ideologically or 
morally superior (i. e. with regards to Taiwan, the USSR etc.) (Chan 2009). 
22 For a bibliography of publications about EU-China cultural relations, see: “Judith Staines (2012): Map-
ping Existing Studies on EU-China Cultural Relations“. Online source URL: http://www.eenc.info/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/JStaines-Mapping-Existing-Studies-on-EU-China-Cultural-Relations.pdf (ac-
cessed on February 2nd 2016) 
23 Shambaugh is citing a final plenary communiqué of the Seventeenth Central Committee of the CCP of 
a plenary session on culture in October 2011. 
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European culture to be “high culture“ in contrast to other countries producing rather “low 
culture“ (Bátora 2011)24 – similar to Imperial China. China has opened itself much more to 
European cultural influences and concepts than vice versa. Still, long centuries of ex-
change of thoughts between both regions prove that they have many transnational roots. 
But while there really is an enormous treasure of cultural heritage, history and potential 
on both sides, notions of superiority and inferiority complicate cultural relations.  
 
To give an example from Germany, recently, intensive “museum diplomacy” between 
several leading museums from different German states led to great pioneering exhibition 
exchanges. A joint exhibition by the Palace Museum and the museum Staatliche Kunst-
sammlungen in Dresden, Germany, displayed treasures of the Chinese and the Saxon-
Polish courts side by side in Germany for the first time. But once the exhibition opened in 
Beijing, the German exhibits were presented solely. Chinese officials seemed to feel un-
comfortable about this concept of having Chinese art displayed side by side and in direct 
comparison with European art of the same epoch.25  
 
Unity and Diversity 
Both China and Europe are vast and diverse entities, so that the projection of a “Chinese“ 
or “European“ culture needs be an essentialism. And in both regions culture and its repre-
sentation in foreign relations bears political fuel for conflict regarding the dimensions of 
domestic politics of unity and diversity, but with diametrically opposed approaches.  
 
Liu (2009: 197) contrasts these two tendencies. While in Europe, foreign cultural rela-
tions have to protect and underline the diversity of European languages and cultures26, to 
especially protect minority cultures and to refrain from a “cultural unification” both inter-
nally as well as in external representations, in China, domestic cultural politics display 
folkloristic diversity but emphasise harmony, unity and even homogenisation. For exam-
ple, the Communist Party of China subsumes almost 92 per cent of China’s population 
                                               
24 Bromark and Herbjoernsrud (2005) even claim that “(...) we have developed a self-glorifying image of 
Europe which is possibly the most Eurocentric ever, and forgotten our transnational heritage.“ (Cited in 
Naess 2009: 41).  
25 The exhibition (on the German side) was called “Golden Dragon, White Eagle - Art in the Service of 
Power at the Imperial Court of China and at the Saxon-Polish Court (1644-1795)”. For more information 
on this exhibition see, for example: http://www.asianartnewspaper.com/article/golden-dragon-white-
eagle (accessed February 2nd 2016). 
26 “Following Article 151(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the ‘…Community shall 
contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and 
regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.’” (quoted in 
Liu 2009: 196). 
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under the “Han nationality“, thereby socially constructing the largest single ethnic group 
in the world.27 This reflects an approach of politicising culture in an attempt at identity 
formation during the stage of state-building which European governments have also used 
over a long period of time (Liu 2009). In Europe, this process of national identity for-
mation was accompanied by conflicting nationalisms and centuries of wars. It propelled 
images of racial superiority, for example in Hitler’s Nazi Germany, with rigid censorship 
and propaganda machines distorting and instrumentalising aspects of arts and culture. 
The collective memory of dreadful atrocities in Europe is key to today’s liberal values in 
the EU including freedom of expression and freedom of the arts.  
 
Freedom of Expression versus Censorship 
Hence, in Europe, artists are often expected to play an important role in publicly inspiring 
critical reflections about society, constituting a “critical vanguard“ (Zhu 2012). This differs 
greatly from the traditional or socialist roles granted to artists in China. Still, with a new 
emphasis on innovation in China, as well as the continuous process of modernisation and 
opening up, diversification is under way.  
 
Against that backdrop, co-operating with a political system that clearly operates with 
censorship and repression of both artists and freedom of expression raises many questions 
for European cultural actors. European actors remain divided over the question of  
whether (and to what degree) to allow for censorship by the Chinese government and to 
pursue non-confrontational cultural co-operation with China or to push the boundaries of 
co-operation to create spaces for challenging and more confrontational ideas. This is a 
central conflict in cultural relations between China and Europe and assessments of situa-
tions differ greatly on both sides. While some red lines are clear, i. e. Taiwan, Tibet and 
Tiananmen, for Europeans it is often hard to understand which aspects could raise disa-
greement and trigger censorship. For example, an initially successful joint exhibition 
project of the twin cities Hamburg and Shanghai about Jews migrating from Hamburg to 
Shanghai to find refuge in China from Nazi persecution in Germany – a topic that, in the 
German partners’ eyes, shows China in a positive light and should hence be non-
confrontational – in the end failed to overcome disagreements over the production of a 
                                               
27 On the basis of Stalinist criteria for nationalities from 1913, the Communist Party officially recognised 
only 56 nationalities in China out of around 400 groups applying for minority status (Olson 1998: 127f.) - 
although “(m)ost ethnologists would agree that these minorities are divided into hundreds of ethnic 
groups. The central government, however, has refused to acknowledge such diversity.“ (Olson 1998: ix) 
Furthermore, “(…) the government insists on maintaining the fiction that there is only one Chinese 
language, and that it is divided into a series of dialects...” in order not to have to “recognize major ethnic 
divisions with the dominant Han people”. (Olson 1998: vii) 
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joint catalogue. This was due to attempts at censorship from the Chinese side, amongst 
other things, of eye witnesses’ reports: The image depicted by some Jews of the Japanese 
occupiers did not meet the image of Japanese cruelty regularly propagated in China. The 
Germans then published the catalogue on their own – uncensored. This disagreement left 
a sour taste after an otherwise successful co-operation.  
 
Chinese officials have even censored and abrogated cultural projects involving China 
abroad. For example, in 1996, the Munich cultural festival “China heute“ (China today), to 
which 180 Chinese artists had been invited, was cancelled by the Chinese Ministry of 
Culture and the artists were not allowed to leave the country, as it claimed that it had not 
been informed about the planned participation of dissidents (Meissner 2002: 191f.). And in 
1998, the whole cast of a kunqu opera was not allowed to leave China for a performance 
in Paris (Meissner 2002: 189). To date, China still represses dissident artists. The behaviour 
of the Chinese government is hard to predict and often takes project partners by surprise. 
For example, in 2012, a huge co-operation project including governments, major museums 
and a large foundation resulted in an extensive exhibition of art from around the epoch of 
the enlightenment and additional discussion fora and salons for thought exchange be-
tween European and Chinese intellectuals which had taken years of preparation, co-
operation and compromise. The project involved governmental and non-governmental 
actors on both sides and organisers remained continuously cautious of seeking compro-
mises with Chinese officials. Although the exhibition itself was more a traditional mode of 
“cultural representation“, the discussion fora were designed to initiate constructive inter-
cultural dialogues. The whole project then suffered a disappointing setback and a very 
regrettable personal calamity when Chinese artist Ai Weiwei was detained almost simul-
taneously to the exhibition’s opening. Chinese news around this largest exhibition of 
European art in China turned dead silent and discussion fora turned very cautious. The 
German public debate was split with some criticising the over-politicisation and the ges-
ture of pointing the pedantic finger at China via an exhibition of art and others criticising 
the lack of a political edge of it.  
 
These examples all show that, on the one side, new breakthroughs in co-operation 
projects with China have been made, but, on the other side, insecurities, sensitivities and 
clashes of ideology continue to exist and often take partners by surprise. Such “authoritar-
ian setbacks“ are a definite risk for project co-operation with China and co-operation 
partners are then often confronted with challenges and criticism both in China and at 
home – ending up betwixt and between.   
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Different Types of Actors on Both Sides of the Partnership 
The different political roles of arts and culture are also reflected in the types of cultural 
actors in Europe and China. Europe’s emphasis on independence of the arts results in a 
great variety of non-governmental actors involved in external cultural relations and the 
arts in Europe and governance remains “very much decentralized“ (Liu 2009). Although 
recently a diversification of cultural actors is under way and non-governmental as well as 
quasi-non-governmental actors have evolved in China, many cultural actors and all offi-
cial publishing houses remain state-run. For example, private publishers are officially 
banned (BIZ Beijing 2014). Therefore, expectations can differ greatly between Chinese and 
European co-operation partners and different political settings and types of actors entail 
different organisational cultures, resources, goals and agendas. Among European actors, it 
is especially those with long-term time horizons, like intermediary cultural institutions 
and foundations aiming at bridge building between the cultures, that allow for absorbing 
short-term risks of setbacks and make it possible to continuously work towards better 
relations in this difficult setting (see Anheier 2012). Unfortunately, foreign-run institu-
tions, international foundations and NGOs in China as well as domestic non-state actors 
often encounter a general suspicion by the state and a difficult legal situation.28 So any co-
operation has to bear these restrictions in mind. While Chinese governmental institutions 
are a legal option, they often represent a state agenda and have to be chosen well: Some 
officials are more open and internationally trained in cultural management than others. 
Non-state partners, on the other hand, often have to look for creative ways for establishing 
joint projects while remaining in legal limbo. 
 
Fears of Westernisation 
Recently, China is rediscovering its own cultural heritage as a resource for nation-building 
and identity formation after the weakening of Socialist ideology, and as a resource for 
party legitimacy, international recognition and soft power (see also Ding and Shambaugh 
in this volume). But next to Socialist and traditional ideals, a third logic of an increasing 
economisation of culture and entertainment triggers processes of liberalisation and diver-
sification that also produce alternative and subcultures, using, for example, the internet as 
a space for expression (see Arsène in this volume). These attempts at promoting moderni-
sation and economic growth, traditional Chinese virtues and advancing a Socialist culture 
– all at the same time – produces internal tensions. Globalisation, growing foreign cultural 
influences, cultural economisation, and hence growing international cultural market com-
                                               
28 See, for example, the Overseas NGO Management Draft Law publicised in 2015. This Draft Law 
aroused much criticism with its planned tightening of controls of foreign NGOs in China.  
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petition affect China’s outlook on international cultural relations and domestic “cultural 
security” and propelled a sense that – following former president Hu – “(t)he West is 
trying to dominate China by spreading its culture and ideology and that China must 
strengthen its cultural production to defend against the assault.” Hu talked about a cul-
tural war and of “international hostile forces (…) intensifying the strategic plot of western-
ising and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their 
long-term infiltration…“ (Wong 2012). Such a view point can again reduce spaces to ma-
noeuvre for international cultural actors operating with and in China. 
 
Conclusion 
In China 
 
“[t]he promotion of traditional culture should help to stabilize the political system, 
while modern cultural currents – avant-garde art, all kinds of non-conformist cultural 
activities, non-governmental cultural activities and so on – are still regarded as poten-
tially dangerous. In this context, traditional European culture, especially in its classical 
manifestations, is welcome – as long as it does not provoke unorthodox and critical 
thinking […].“ Meissner (2002: 185)  
 
But European cultural actors should try to move away from pure traditional, old-
fashioned cultural “representation“, which is easily instrumentalised. For culture as a 
GPG, it is detrimental if European art is used for a framework (i. e. a mega event such as 
the Shanghai Expo or the Beijing Olympics) that aims at legitimising an authoritarian 
regime. The aim should be to jointly co-create art and culture and open up spaces for 
ideas and paths of intercultural expression as well as trying to make room for the critical 
and contrarian view under the umbrella of international exchange. In this respect, spaces 
to manoeuvre should be tested. What Anheier (2012: 11) noted as an advantage for foun-
dations i. e. in intercultural dialogue, “…that they can take the long view, and are not 
necessarily guided by short-term expectations of markets or politics“. In the eyes of Kas-
par König, former director of the Museum Ludwig in Cologne, should also be honoured 
in the work ethics of cultural agents dealing with China: In his view, it should not be 
about earning money and winning contracts. Cultural agents should not act naively but 
negotiate harder with clear red lines of when to call off a project (see Lorch 2011). Others 
argue that it is always better to have a dialogue rather than none.  
 
It is important to ask whether that dialogue opens up more space than it closes and 
does not reinforce boundaries of freedom. This balance is hard to strike and it is a process 
of gauging the limits which requires a lot of experience and management by perception. 
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Giving in to censorship requirements and practising self-censorship threatens a project’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of a European public. Not to do so can threaten the realisation of a 
project in or with China. Institutions with long-term planning horizons can accumulate 
experience and act as key bridge builders and absorb risks of setbacks and criticism. 
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When I was speaking about the Belt and Road Initiative at the Italian think tank Instituto 
Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale in March 23, 2014, I was asked, whether the Belt and 
Road Initiative was China’s Marshall Plan and in how far it would conceptually go be-
yond simple trade routes.  
 
Compared with the Marshall Plan, the initiative has richer connotations. According to 
the initiative, relevant countries should work together to discuss project investment, build 
infrastructure and share the benefits of cooperation. They should promote as their five 
major goals policy coordination, facility connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integra-
tion and people-to-people bonds. 
 
The Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road joins 65 countries and regions, 
but is not limited to those countries, in Central Asia, ASEAN, South Asia, Middle-Eastern 
Europe, West Asia, North Africa and beyond into a giant economy of 4.4 billion people 
and about 21 trillion US Dollar GDP, 63 and 29 per cent of respective global total. It is a 
comprehensive mutual-connectivity network of transportation, consisting of railways, 
highways, air- and sea-ways, oil and gas pipelines, and transmission lines as well as 
communications networks. 
 
There are three missions ahead for the Belt and Road Initiative. 
 
1. Seeking a way for global economic growth in the post-crisis era 
As globalisation, Americanisation and Westernisation wane in influence, the new engine 
of global economic growth, China brings its advantages in productivity, technology, fund-
ing, experience and development and then model them into cooperation opportunities 
and market advantages. The Belt and Road Initiative is the result of this transformation 
and China’s all-round opening-up drive. 
 
Through construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, China shares the dividend of its 
reforms and development and also brings the experience and lessons it has drawn from its 
own development to other countries. China strives to promote cooperation and dialogue 
among countries along the Silk Road, set up a new type of global partnership that is more 
                                               
29 This contribution is based on Yiwei Wang’s presentation at the IV. Public Diplomacy Forum, 7-8th 
October 2015, Berlin. 
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equal and balanced, and strengthens the foundations for long-term and sustainable devel-
opment of the world economy. 
 
China`s trade with Belt and Road countries has topped 1 trillion US Dollar in 2013, a 
quarter of the country`s total, after a decade of 19% average annual growth, 4% higher 
than China`s overall trade growth, this trade is still expanding fast. In the coming 10 
years, trade will increase 1 trillion US Dollar because of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
According to Bloomberg prediction, by 2050, BRI will provide 3 billion global middle 
class. 
 
2. Realising global rebalancing 
Traditional globalisation starts from the sea. Coastal regions and maritime states develop 
first, while inland countries fall behind, forming a massive wealth gap. Traditional global-
isation was ushered in by Europe and carried forward by the US, creating a West-centric 
world in which the East was subject to the West, rural areas inferior to urban areas and 
land not as important as the sea. 
 
Nowadays the Belt and Road Initiative is rebalancing the planet. It encourages open-
ing up to the West to promote development of China’s Western areas as well as inland 
like the Central Asian countries and Mongolia. It also advocates the concept of inclusive 
development in the international community. 
 
At the same time, China takes the initiative in promoting its high-quality production 
and industries with comparative advantages to the West. Countries along the Silk Road 
will be the first to benefit from this. This will change the situation in which these countries 
only served as a corridor for trade and cultural exchanges between the East and West and 
were less developed in the past. Hence the initiative will overcome the wealth gap and 
regional imbalance caused by the globalisation that originated with Europeans. It will 
help build a harmonious world with lasting peace, universal security and common pros-
perity. 
 
3. Creating a new model for regional cooperation in the 21st century 
China’s reform and opening-up drive is the greatest innovation in today’s world. As an 
all-around opening up strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative stresses broad consultation, 
joint contribution and shared benefits. It transcends the Marshall Plan, outbound assis-
tance and globalisation strategies. The initiative introduces new concepts for international 
cooperation in the 21st century. 
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For example, the concept of an economic belt is an innovative regional economic co-
operation model. A new Eurasian Land Bridge, the China-Mongolia-Russia, China-
Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors work as 
growth poles to benefit surrounding areas. The concept of a Silk Road Economic Belt is 
different from various economic zones and unions that have appeared in history. The 
economic belt is more flexible and can be easily applied to broad areas. 
 
All participants are equal. In line with the principle of voluntary participation and co-
ordination for common progress, they shall uphold the Silk Road spirit of being open for 
cooperation, harmonious and inclusive and mutually beneficial. As was pointed out in the 
just-published “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road”30, the initiative aims at promoting orderly and free flow of 
economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of markets. 
 
This will encourage countries along the belt and road to coordinate economic policy 
and carry out broader, more in-depth regional cooperation of a higher standard. The 
initiative will encourage countries to jointly create an open, inclusive and balanced re-
gional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all. 
 
Jointly building the belt and road is in the interests of the global community. Reflect-
ing on the common ideals and pursuit of human societies, the initiative is a positive en-
deavour that seeks new models of international cooperation and global governance. The 
Belt and Road Initiative will inject new positive energy into world peace and develop-
ment. 
 
As Confucius said, “If one wishes to stand on one’s own feet, one must help others to 
stand on their own feet; if one wishes to succeed, one must help others to succeed.” Every 
country has their own development needs and China’s Belt and Road Initiative aims to 
help other countries to achieve the goals set down by UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. For instance, 68 per cent of world poverty alleviation can be attributed to 
China. In today’s world, 1,100 million people are without electric power (350 million in 
India), and Chinese GRID comparative advantage helps them. 
  
In terms of building infrastructure, China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System will 
provide coverage for countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative by 2018 and its 
                                               
30 http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html 
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coverage will be global by 2020, at which times global networks will no longer have to 
rely on the internet. This will be advantageous for road building and long-distance educa-
tion and these initiatives will help people in poor parts of the world to benefit from high 
technology. In addition, China has a wealth of experience in developing as a country, 
some developments have been successful, others not so. We can help China’s neighbours 
to learn from our successes and avoid making the same mistakes. 
 
In conclusion, the gap between a Public Goods demand and its provision in today’s 
world underlines the legitimacy of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
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Making the Internet for the Public Good 
Since the end of the 1970s, a widespread belief in the economic, social and political bene-
fits of the “information society” encouraged many countries, including China, to invest 
massively in the development of telecommunications. Nowadays the internet has become 
an essential part of daily life for almost half of the world’s – and China’s – population. It 
has become a key facilitator in maintaining social networks, finding a job, using public 
services, accessing useful information, or simply enjoying popular entertainment. Because 
it is so ubiquitous, there is now a sense that not having access to the internet is a form of 
exclusion, and some even wonder whether internet access may be considered a human 
right. 
 
While there is consensus on the general idea that the internet bears a character of pub-
lic interest, there is much less convergence on the particular implications of this idea. As 
half of the world’s population still does not have internet access, the idea that access is a 
right is quite problematic, as well as the question of who should bear the costs of universal 
access, and how to rebalance the uneven distribution of infrastructure, technology, con-
tents and digital literacy. How to regulate activities online is also a matter of controversy, 
as economic and political interests diverge, as well as normative preferences. This is fur-
ther complicated by the great number of layers that the internet is composed of, and there-
fore the great number of actors implicated in making and managing it.  
 
In this chapter I will describe the main components of global internet governance, and 
highlight some of the questions it raises in terms of global public interest. I will then dis-
cuss the increasingly important role China has played in this framework so far and high-
light how the Chinese case points to democratic cracks in the current internet governance 
system.  
 
The concept of internet governance is most often used32 to refer to the definition of 
technical standards for the internet and to the management of “critical resources”, like the 
                                               
31 This article was written in February 2016. 
32 Denardis and Musiani identify six main objects of Internet governance: administration of critical 
Internet resources such as names and numbers; establishment of Internet technical standards; access 
and interconnection coordination; cybersecurity governance; policy role of private information interme-
diaries; architecture-based intellectual property rights enforcement. Laura DeNardis and Francesca 
Musiani, “Governance by Infrastructure,” in Francesca Musiani, Derrick L. Cogburn, Laura DeNardis, and 
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allocation of IP addresses and domain names. These features require global coordination 
to ensure interoperability and proper information routing. To manage them, members of 
the industry, engineers, academics and civil society members crafted ad hoc decision-
making organisations. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is composed of infor-
mal working groups, generally coordinated via mailing lists, which collectively develop 
and validate new technical standards. The members of the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C), generally industry players, software editors or academic institutions, elaborate 
standards and specifications to guarantee universal interoperability of internet technolo-
gies. ICANN, a private not-for-profit corporation based in California, was mandated by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce to coordinate a global network of institutions dedicat-
ed to the allocation of IP addresses and domain names. It pioneered a “multistakeholder” 
model of governance that includes a variety of actors of the industry, along with civil 
society and engaged individuals, with a consultative role on the part of states.  
 
Beyond the variety of these set-ups, these institutions share the principle that any in-
terested party should be able to participate in the decision-making process, and each of 
them takes pride in their openness, transparency and inclusiveness. However the tech-
nical nature of the issues, the cost of participation and the complicated voting mechanisms 
go against these stated principles, and debates tend to take place among rather small 
communities of experts. ICANN in particular has attracted criticism for its bias towards 
developed countries and lobbies (in 2012 the decision to launch a global bid for new top-
level domain names, like .sport or .paris, was particularly controversial) (DeNardis 2014). 
In general, although these institutions claim that they work for the interests of all internet 
users, there has been no real reflection or debate on the definition of a global public inter-
est for the internet. 
 
The industry and service providers also play an important role in internet governance, 
taken in a larger sense. Their decisions on infrastructure, technology, design, business 
models, and terms of use, all have a direct impact on internet users’ agency, including 
access to information, privacy, or freedom of speech. For example, Apple and Google’s 
gatekeeper role come under criticism when they refuse to include applications in the App 
Store and Play Store, for reasons related to contents that they consider inappropriate (like 
nudity) or politically sensitive (localising drones in Pakistan for example). Being in the 
hands of private companies, most decisions are taken by a handful of individuals, with 
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little knowledge or approval of users, and with little possibility to appeal. Despite their 
claims of acting for the good of humanity (see Google’s “do no evil” motto), the great 
power exercised by these global internet companies lacks transparency and democratic 
legitimacy. This is detrimental to the companies themselves, as they are confronted with 
difficult political, ethical, and diplomatic issues that would normally be the responsibility 
of states.  
 
Faced with increasing concerns regarding cybercrime, like privacy infringement, bul-
lying, scams, traffics, or copyright disputes, states are now paying more attention to all 
dimensions of internet governance in the name of national public interest and public 
order. More and more states are therefore passing laws criminalising certain kinds of 
online activities, enabling the blocking of foreign websites or requesting to host sensitive 
data on their territories. After revelations by Edward Snowden on the extent of the NSA’s 
global surveillance, and with increased awareness of cybersecurity issues, states have 
extra motivation to look at the internet through the lens of national interest. As there is a 
shared concern for the stability and security of the internet, as well as a recognised need to 
avoid any escalation in potential cyberattacks, cybersecurity is mostly discussed in the 
framework of intergovernmental dialogue, be it bilateral or multilateral. While this all 
makes things difficult for industry players who are confronted with multiple and some-
times contradictory regulations, civil society actors warn of a possible “balkanisation” (or 
in fact localisation) of the internet, which would “kill” the ideal of a global public space. 
 
Global-scale initiatives abound to discuss these issues. In the beginning of the 2000s, 
the United Nations initiated the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and 
created the yearly Internet Governance Forum (IGF)33, with a view to finding a compre-
hensive, “multistakeholder” framework for internet governance. In 2012, the Dubai sum-
mit of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was the stage of a showdown 
between supporters and opponents of a proposal to let the ITU take over more responsi-
bilities over the global internet. The status quo prevailed after a Manichean debate where 
the issue was framed as opposing a “free” and “open” multistakeholder model with an 
intergovernmental, United Nations-based framework associated with authoritarian gov-
ernments. In spring 2014, Brazil launched an initiative called Netmundial34, where some 
700 delegates from governments, the private sector, civil society, the technical community, 
and academia produced a roadmap for future internet governance, based on the princi-
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ples of multistakeholderism, human rights, transparency and accountability, among oth-
ers. In their final declaration, participants “recognised that the internet is a global resource 
which should be managed in the public interest.”35 But these initiatives have borne few 
concrete results so far, perhaps because of their ambition to tackle internet governance in 
an all-encompassing, consensual way, thus ignoring the diversity of mechanisms and 
issues at stake, and shying away from addressing contentious, political issues. Meanwhile, 
practical decisions on technology, standards, regulation, design, business models, etc. are 
taken daily by a myriad of actors for whom public interest is but a secondary concern, and 
with practically no checks and balances in place. 
 
As these political stakes are coming to light, the global balance of power is also chang-
ing, with the advent of new powerful actors such as transnational companies that handle 
the personal data of billions of people, rights-defence organisations and activists, and 
governments of developing countries. Among these new actors, the emergence of China 
as a “new cyber power” has increasingly affected discussions of global internet govern-
ance, not only because China's internet users constitute about 20% of the world's online 
population, but also because the Chinese government and businesses have become much 
more visible and assertive on the global stage. 
 
Chinese Approach to Internet Governance/Sovereignty 
In line with global discourses on the “information society”, the Chinese authorities have 
long seen the internet as a key growth engine and as a strategic tool to develop technolog-
ical, economic, and cultural power. Domestically, the internet also represents the promise 
of a more modern and wealthy Chinese way of life, which is crucial to respond to the 
aspirations of the younger generations and thus sustain the Communist Party's legitimacy 
in power.36  
 
In 2010 the Chinese government published a White Paper for the Internet in China, 
which formulated “cyber sovereignty” as an essential principle to enable China to em-
brace the internet while containing political risks. With this concept, it claims the right and 
legitimacy to control online activities in the name of social order and stability, and it calls 
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for an intergovernmental governance framework and the principle of non-interference in 
the domestic cyber policy of other countries.  
 
The technical and regulatory set-up of the Chinese internet reflects these principles. In 
the 1990s, while the Chinese government was massively investing in networks all over the 
country, it also launched the Golden Shield project to develop cutting-edge filtering and 
blocking technologies aimed at limiting access to foreign websites and at monitoring 
online public opinion. Since then, licensing rules for internet service providers and content 
providers, and systematic verification of “real names” on all popular platforms have 
ensured political caution from companies and users. More recently, Chinese authorities 
have imposed further constraints on internet businesses, such as mandatory local storage 
of sensitive data like banking information, interdiction of foreign investment in internet 
content providers, or, as proposed in a 2016 draft law on the Domain Name System, regis-
tration of domain names with a Chinese service provider for China-based websites.  
 
Taken together, these measures show a will to bring internet infrastructure, businesses 
and critical data on the Chinese territory within the reach of the Chinese authorities. This 
facilitates information control (for both censorship and surveillance), guarantees better 
protection against supposed cybersecurity threats, and provides advantages to Chinese 
businesses. However it does not, I believe, constitute a separate Chinese ‘intranet’ as is 
often suggested by metaphors like the “Great Firewall of China”. Indeed, despite these 
control and localisation measures, the Chinese internet is highly interconnected with 
global infrastructures. For example, Chinese domain names are set up in compliance with 
ICANN's rules; Chinese internet service providers set up servers around the world for 
better service to overseas customers; foreign IT companies have branches in China to cater 
to the Chinese market. Chinese authorities want the best of both worlds, with access to the 
economic and social benefits of the global internet, and even the capacity to project Chi-
na's soft power globally, and simultaneously to limit political threats in China. In other 
words, China has a vested interest in the stability of the global internet infrastructure. 
 
Moreover, the temptation to implement localising measures is not technically a speci-
ficity of China. This is part of a strong trend towards more “localisation” of the internet, 
for a variety of political, legal, cultural and marketing reasons. For instance many coun-
tries have also mandated the surveillance and blocking of some content in the name of the 
protection of citizens, and more and more governments are also calling for a local storage 
of data out of cybersecurity concerns. Copyright issues also motivate content providers to 
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limit the availability of cultural products to one specific country or to the customers of one 
specific network.  
 
The specificities of China and other authoritarian countries in this regard are political. 
They lie in the extensive focus on political websites and surveillance of opponents, the 
particularly blurry legal framework and opaque decision-making, as well as the absence 
of appeal, all of which come down to the absence of a true rule of law. Beyond the heated 
but simplistic debates on how to preserve the “openness” of the internet, the political set-
up of the Chinese internet highlights, if needed, the importance of crafting democratic 
governance mechanisms to set and enforce legitimate norms and rules for the internet, at 
both a national and global level. 
 
Pushing for an International Governance Framework 
China's leaders and cyber policy experts tend to see the global internet as an “anarchic 
space” where Western countries, and particularly the U.S., exercise “hegemonic” power as 
the marginalisation of governments and apparent inclusiveness may in fact mask over-
whelming domination by participants from developed, Western countries. Suspicion is 
especially strong in the case of ICANN because of its links with the American govern-
ment.37  
 
As a result, Chinese experts and policy-makers have always expressed clear prefer-
ence for intergovernmental frameworks, especially the UN, where, due to the principle 
of “one state, one vote”, developing countries are represented on a more equal footing 
with developed countries, and where civil society and corporate interests usually have no 
more than a consultative voice. Such frameworks are also bound by standard diplomatic 
negotiation norms, as opposed to the “rough consensus” principle that prevails in tech-
nical and multistakeholder communities, whereby it is difficult for a single actor or state 
to effectively block or withdraw from any specific measure. China is an active participant 
in various bilateral and multilateral dialogues, in particular in the field of cybersecurity. 
However this format is not entirely satisfying for China, as it is not systematically part of 
the conversation (it is not a member of the G8), and bilateral cooperation is open to sus-
pension from either side in case of diplomatic tensions. For example, when five members 
of the People’s Liberation Army were indicted in the U.S. for cyberespionage in May 2014, 
China stopped participation in a U.S.-China cybersecurity working group established only 
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a year earlier. Top-level cooperation resumed in the autumn of 2015 with the establish-
ment of a U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues.  
 
Given the uncertainties of such discussion platforms, the Chinese government consid-
ers the United Nations to be the ideal framework for global internet governance. The 2010 
White Paper states: “China holds that the role of the UN should be given full scope in 
international internet administration. China supports the establishment of an authoritative 
and just international internet administration organisation under the UN system through 
democratic procedures on a worldwide scale.” Chinese representatives spared no efforts 
throughout the 2000s to push this agenda. At the 2005 World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) in Tunis, the Chinese government tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain agree-
ment that the responsibilities of ICANN should be transferred to the International Tele-
communications Union. At the 2012 Dubai ITU summit, China pushed for enlarging the 
role of the ITU to include such issues as cybersecurity and the domain name system. In 
2011 and in 2015, China teamed up with Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to propose 
(without success) a Code of Conduct for Information Security to the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. This document pleaded for “multilateral, transparent and democratic 
international internet governance.”  
 
Despite these efforts, the chances are very slim that China will succeed in this quest. It 
is true that China has been able to obtain small concessions, like the inclusion of the word 
“multilateral” in the final report of the Ten-Year Review of the World Summit on the 
Information Society in December 2015. This highlights the fact that China can find allianc-
es in global governance institutions, notably with developing countries such as some 
members of the Group of 77 (which brings together developing countries), as well as more 
advanced cyber powers such as Russia. However these allies remain in the minority and 
generally amongst less powerful countries. In particular, although European countries are 
more nuanced than the United States in their support for the multistakeholder model, and 
insist more often on the role states can play to defend the interests of citizens, they still 
stand against the idea of a purely intergovernmental governance model, as this could 
enable some states to block measures in favour of the Human Rights, or to push for a 
nation-based architecture of the Internet, deemed by some as “balkanisation.” 
 
The Chinese Way in Multistakeholderism? 
In light of this situation, Chinese leaders have had to find their own way within the cur-
rent governance model. Even as official representatives were publicly expressing criticism 
of multistakeholder organisations, individual Chinese engineers and academics continued 
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to participate in meetings and working groups, and contributed to developing essential 
technology, such as encoding for Chinese-character domain names (to create urls like 
www.网站.中国).  
 
In the early 2010s, the Chinese leadership seemed to adopt a rather more cooperative 
attitude. For example, Chinese representatives were sent to participate in the Governmen-
tal Advisory Committee of ICANN after nearly a decade of interruption. Lu Wei, former 
head of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), and Jack Ma, CEO of the Chinese 
internet giant Alibaba, are both members of the board of Netmundial. This increased 
participation by officials and key public figures can be analysed either as a sign of a 
pragmatic approach by the Chinese government or as a more profound change in strategy 
and attitude on the international stage, related in part to China’s new confidence in its 
own capacity to defend its interests within the existing global governance framework. 
 
Indeed, in light of the growth of China's internet sector, it seems that China can take 
advantage of the multistakeholder scheme to advance its agenda, in particular through 
the private sector. During the last three decades, China has striven to develop “indigenous 
innovation” in order to reduce its dependency on foreign technology and competencies. It 
now has the world's most numerous internet users and some of the most dynamic internet 
businesses (think of Alibaba, Tencent), which are very attractive to the global internet 
industry, so much so that many internet platforms are ready to make concessions on 
freedom of speech and handling of personal data in order to access the Chinese market. 
The apparent rapprochement of Xi Jinping and Lu Wei, former head of the Cyberspace 
Administration of China, with the American internet giants during the Chinese-American 
technology forum in September 2015, as well as the trips by Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook's 
CEO, to China, suggest that the Chinese leadership is now looking to the private sector for 
alliances at a global level.  
 
Conclusion 
In 2014, China initiated a yearly World Internet Conference, held in the Chinese town of 
Wuzhen, where the former head of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Lu Wei, and 
in 2015 the Chinese president himself, Xi Jinping, asserted the role of China as a new cyber 
power, and expressed strong support for the cyber sovereignty principle.  
 
The motto of the conference is “an interconnected world shared and governed by all,” 
in a formulation that adroitly stops short of clarifying whether “all” are states or other 
actors or both, and how their respective roles should be balanced. However it is clear that 
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the Chinese leadership sees the internet through the lens of national interest, and more 
particularly through the interests of the Communist party in power. For Chinese leaders, 
global cooperation on internet governance is mainly necessary to guarantee the stability of 
the internet from a technical point of view, and to build “peaceful coexistence” between 
cyber-sovereigns. But few among the Chinese cyber experts and policy makers believe in 
the internet as a global public good, as they tend to see this concept as a rhetorical offen-
sive in favour of American hegemony.  
 
Chinese positions seem to have a polarising effect on the global debates on internet 
governance, with concepts like multistakeholderism, multilateralism and cyber sovereign-
ty referred to in terms of whether the internet can remain “open” or “free”. Such Mani-
chean discussions do not seem to effectively tackle the democratic issues that are raised by 
the highly transnational and privatised character of internet governance. Indeed, the fact 
that the Chinese government is now finding its way through the current multistakeholder 
system, and even more in direct cooperation with global internet giants like Apple or 
Facebook (despite the latter being blocked in China), underlines the shortcomings of the 
current global internet governance system in terms of democratic procedures and guaran-
tees. As a result, the formulation of a global public interest for the internet remains a chal-
lenge. 
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As China’s global power grows, Beijing is learning that its image matters. For all its eco-
nomic and military might, the country suffers from a severe shortage of soft power.  
According to global public opinion surveys, it enjoys a decidedly mixed international 
image. While China’s economic prowess impresses much of the world, its repressive 
political system and mercantilist business practices tarnish its reputation. And so, in an 
attempt to improve perceptions, Beijing has mounted a major public relations offensive in 
recent years, investing billions of dollars around the world in a variety of efforts. 
 
Although Beijing’s publicity blitz began in 2007 under President Hu Jintao, it has in-
tensified under President Xi Jinping. In October 2011, as Xi was preparing to take power, 
the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) devoted a whole 
plenary session to the issue of culture, with the final communiqué declaring that it was a 
national goal to “build our country into a socialist cultural superpower.” And in 2014, Xi 
announced, “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and 
better communicate China’s messages to the world.” Under Xi, China has bombarded the 
world with a welter of new initiatives: “the Chinese dream,” “the Asia-Pacific dream,” 
“the Silk Road Economic Belt,” the Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road,” “a new 
type of major-country relations,” and many others. It is easy to dismiss such talk as “slo-
gan diplomacy,” but Beijing nonetheless attaches great importance to it. 
 
China is fleshing out these rhetorical salvos in proposed institutions, such as the New 
Development Bank (a project organized by China together with Brazil, Russia, India, and 
South Africa), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific. All of these would supplement a host of regional bodies that China has al-
ready created in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and central and eastern 
Europe. Through these institutions, China is meticulously constructing an alternative 
architecture to the postwar Western order.  
 
And it is backing up its soft-power ventures with serious money: $50 billion for the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, $41 billion for the New Development Bank, $40 
billion for the Silk Road Economic Belt, and $25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road. Beijing 
has also pledged to invest $1.25 trillion worldwide by 2025. This scale of investment is 
                                               
38 Republished with permission of Foreign Affairs, from Foreign Affairs Volume 94 Number 4 July/August 
2015; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. 
China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect by David Shambaugh 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy A New Responsible Power China?                                                      79 
unprecedented: even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union did not 
spend anywhere near as much as China is spending today. Together, these recent pledges 
by Beijing add up to $1.41 trillion; in contrast, the Marshall Plan cost the equivalent of 
$103 billion in today’s dollars. 
 
China’s diplomatic and development schemes form just one part of a much broader 
agenda aimed at enhancing its soft power in media, publishing, education, the arts, sports, 
and other domains. Nobody knows for sure how much China spends on these activities, 
but analysts estimate that the annual budget for “external propaganda” runs in the neigh-
borhood of $10 billion annually. By contrast, the U.S. Department of State spent $666 
million on public diplomacy in fiscal year 2014. 
 
Clearly, Beijing is using the strongest instrument in its soft-power toolbox: money. 
Wherever Chinese leaders travel these days—and between them, Xi and Premier Li 
Keqiang visited more than 50 countries in 2014—they sign huge trade and investment 
deals, extend generous loans, and dole out hefty aid packages. Major powers always try to 
use their financial assets to buy influence and shape the actions of others; in this regard, 
China is no different. But what is striking about China’s investments is how low a return 
they appear to be yielding. Actions speak louder than words, and in many parts of the 
world, China’s behavior on the ground contradicts its benign rhetoric. In China, “propa-
ganda” is not a derogatory term. 
 
The messengers 
The father of soft power, the political scientist Joseph Nye, defined it as emanating largely 
from society—specifically, cultural, political, and social values. Nye also allowed that a 
country’s political system and foreign policy could earn respect and thus contribute to its 
soft power. But this definition is premised on the clear demarcation that exists in demo-
cratic societies between state and nonstate spheres. In China, the government manipulates 
and manages almost all propaganda and cultural activities. 
 
The Chinese communist system has always accepted that information must be man-
aged and that people must be indoctrinated. In China, “propaganda” is not a derogatory 
term. As the country has opened up to the world, the state has had to try harder to main-
tain its grip on information, and its efforts on this front have become more sophisticated. 
Now, however, Chinese authorities are trying to control information not only inside Chi-
na but increasingly outside, too. 
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The institutional nerve center of this operation is the State Council Information Office 
(SCIO). Located in a Soviet-era building in central Beijing, it looks like and plays the part 
of the Ministry of Truth in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. The SCIO, which forms 
part of a broader propaganda apparatus, coordinates various propaganda efforts, 
and it boasts a large staff, a giant budget, and a great deal of bureaucratic clout. Because 
the SCIO is a key censor and media watchdog in China, the mere mention of its name 
brings a concerned look to the faces of many Chinese, particularly intellectuals and jour-
nalists. 
 
Every December, the SCIO convenes an annual conference at which it outlines guide-
lines for China’s external propaganda work for the coming year. As Jiang Weiqiang, the 
SCIO’s vice minister, explained to me in 2009, the blueprint covers “exhibitions, publica-
tions, media activities, exchange programs, ‘Year of China’ festivals abroad, and other 
activities.” Jiang also called the guidelines “our soft-power strategy.” Secret at the time of 
adoption, the plans are subsequently published in a volume called China Media Yearbook. 
 
In addition to its main role of overseeing the media and coordinating all of China’s ex-
ternal communications, the SCIO acts as a messenger in its own right: it employs spokes-
people, holds press conferences, publishes magazines and books, and produces films. It 
has even developed an app that provides users with one-stop shopping for all of the gov-
ernment’s white papers. Some of the SCIO’s propaganda targets Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
overseas Chinese communities—all high priority audiences for Beijing. And some of it 
targets visitors to China, including foreign residents, tourists, and business travelers, 
through publishing houses such as the Foreign Languages Press and newspapers such as 
China Daily and the Global Times. The SCIO is also involved in controlling Internet content, 
including approving all applications for websites. But the SCIO’s principal responsibility 
is to define the ideas to be propagated abroad and keep other Chinese institutions on 
message. 
 
The media and the message 
A major part of Beijing’s “going out” strategy entails subsidizing the dramatic expansion 
of its media presence overseas, with the goal of establishing its own global media empire 
to break what it considers “the Western media monopoly.” Most prominent among these 
efforts is the Xinhua News Agency, China’s official state news service. From its inception, 
Xinhua has had a dual role, both domestically and internationally: to report news and to 
disseminate Communist Party propaganda. Altogether, Xinhua now employs approxi-
mately 3,000 journalists, 400 of whom are posted abroad in its 170 bureaus. And Xinhua is 
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expanding the staffs of its existing bureaus and beefing up its online presence with audio 
and video content. 
 
Xinhua’s global expansion is motivated not just by concern for China’s international 
image but also by money. Xinhua sees an opportunity to compete head-to-head with the 
main Western newswires, such as the Associated Press, United Press International, Reu-
ters, and Bloomberg. The goal, as one Xinhua official I spoke with in 2010 put it, is to 
become a “real world international news agency.” Xinhua even harbors ambitions of 
becoming a modern multimedia conglomerate, competing with the likes of News Corp, 
Viacom, and Time Warner. And once its online video presence expands, it will try to steal 
market share from 24-hour news channels such as CNN, the BBC, and Al Jazeera. 
 
In its quest for profit, Xinhua publishes descriptive news reports that it markets as a 
cheaper product than what the Western wire services offer. In 2010, Xinhua had 80,000 
paying institutional subscribers, which produced a strong revenue stream. The agency is 
targeting the developing world in particular, where Western media have a smaller pre-
sence and where there is no real domestic competition for international news. Xinhua’s 
inroads there also help fulfill its goal of telling China’s story to the world. 
 
China’s premier state television channel, CCTV, or China Central Television, has also 
gone global. It launched its first 24-hour English channel, CCTV International, in 2000 and 
now broadcasts in six languages around the world. The network is trying to alter its stilt-
ed and propagandistic flavor and package its content in more viewer-friendly formats. In 
2012, CCTV set up new production facilities in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Washington, D.C., 
where it unveiled its ambitious CCTV America channel. The Washington operation, 
CCTV says, will become the global hub of its newsgathering and broadcasting operations. 
 
China is also stepping up its penetration of foreign radio waves. China Radio Interna-
tional, formerly known as Radio Beijing, was founded in 1941 as a wartime propaganda 
tool against Japan but now has far greater reach. With its headquarters in Beijing, it 
broadcasts 392 hours of programming per day in 38 languages and maintains 27 overseas 
bureaus. 
 
These media outlets constitute the major weapons in what China considers a “dis-
course war” with the West, in which Beijing is pushing back against what it perceives as 
anti-China sentiment around the world. But other official organs are also playing a direct 
role in these skirmishes. Chinese embassies now regularly issue press statements rebut-
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ting foreign media characterizations of China, take out full-page ads in foreign newspa-
pers, and attempt to intimidate universities and nongovernmental organizations that 
sponsor events deemed unfriendly to China. Their ambassadors publish op-eds. 
 
There is a harder edge to these efforts, too. The Chinese government now monitors 
foreign China watchers’ and journalists’ writings more carefully than ever before and has 
stepped up its efforts to intimidate the foreign media—both inside and outside China. In 
Beijing, the SCIO and the Foreign Ministry often call foreign journalists in for “tea chats” 
to scold them for articles deemed unfriendly to China. The government has refused to 
renew the visas of a number of journalists (including some from The New York Times) and 
has refused to issue visas for American and European scholars on its blacklist. Outside 
China, embassy officials sometimes warn newspaper editors not to publish articles on 
subjects that might offend Beijing.  
 
Thus, like its propaganda apparatus, China’s censorship machine is going global. And 
it appears to be having an impact. In a troubling trend, foreign China scholars are increas-
ingly practicing self-censorship, worried about their continued ability to visit China. The 
Chinese government has penalized major media outlets, such as Bloomberg, for publish-
ing certain articles. And it has blocked the Chinese-language websites of leading U.S. and 
British newspapers. 
 
Chinese lessons 
Another weapon in China’s arsenal is education. About 300,000 foreign students now 
study in Chinese universities (the vast majority learning the Chinese language), with 
additional numbers in vocational colleges. Every year, the China Scholarship Council 
offers some 20,000 scholarships to foreign students. Chinese government ministries, 
meanwhile, administer a variety of short courses for officials, diplomats, and military 
officers from developing countries. These classes do teach students tangible skills, but 
they also try to win hearts and minds along the way.  
 
Chinese universities have yet to break into the global elite, however. Only three main-
land universities—Peking, Tsinghua, and Fudan— appear in the Times Higher Education’s 
ranking of the world’s top 100 schools. The impediments to academic renown are serious. 
The CCP continues to restrict free thought and inquiry, particularly in the humanities and 
the social sciences. Chinese universities are rife with cronyism, false credentials, plagia-
rism, and intellectual property theft. Innovation, the Chinese government’s top economic 
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priority, requires open-ended intellectual exploration to incubate, but Chinese educational 
pedagogy has yet to escape its historical emphasis on rote memorization and censorship. 
 
China’s Confucius Institutes—centers charged with teaching Chinese language and 
culture abroad—form another key part of the effort to build up China’s educational soft 
power. With 475 centers operating in 120 countries, the Confucius Institutes have estab-
lished footholds worldwide. (By contrast, Germany’s long-established Goethe-Institut has 
160 centers in 94 countries, and the British Council maintains some 70 centers in 49 coun-
tries.) But the Confucius Institutes have come under sharp criticism. In the United States 
and Canada, professors have called on universities to close down existing Confucius 
Institutes or not open new ones on the grounds that they undermine academic freedom. 
And at a Chinese studies conference in 2014 in Portugal, European Sinologists were ran-
kled when Xu Lin—the director of the Ministry of Education organ that oversees the Con-
fucius Institutes—ordered that pages in the conference program that mentioned Taiwan 
be torn out. As in the United States, media outlets and legislatures across Europe are now 
scrutinizing Confucius Institutes, and at least one, at Stockholm University, has decided to 
shut down as a result. 
 
On another front, Beijing is assertively promoting its culture and society abroad 
through sports, fine arts, performing arts, music, film, literature, and architecture—and 
making considerable inroads. Art exhibitions of China’s rich imperial past have always 
been popular around the world; indeed, China’s 3,000-plus years of civilizational heritage 
may be its strongest soft-power asset. Chinese martial artists and other Chinese perform-
ers also attract audiences, as does China’s growing corps of world-class classical musi-
cians, led by the pianist Lang Lang. Chinese films continue to struggle for international 
market share, but Chinese authors and architects are more popular than ever. In 2012, Mo 
Yan won the Nobel Prize in Literature and Wang Shu won the Pritzker Architecture Prize. 
Even though China’s professional basketball, hockey, and soccer teams remain far less 
competitive than their North American and European counterparts, Chinese athletes are 
racking up Olympic medals in a wide range of events.  
 
China is also engaging in what it calls “host diplomacy,” holding countless govern-
mental and nongovernmental conferences. Large-scale conclaves—such as the Boao Fo-
rum for Asia (China’s Davos), the China Development Forum, the Beijing Forum, Tsing-
hua University’s World Peace Forum, the World Forum on China Studies, and the Global 
Think Tank Summit—bring leading figures from around the world to China every year. 
Some events are real extravaganzas, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai 
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World Expo, and the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. In 2016, the G-20 
summit in Hangzhou is expected to be an equally elaborate showcase. 
 
Then there are the government-affiliated exchange programs. The CCP’s International 
Department (and its front organization, the China Center for Contemporary World Stud-
ies) convenes an annual conference called “The Party and the World Dialogue” and brings 
a steady stream of foreign politicians and intellectuals to China for all-expenses-paid ours. 
The Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, which is affiliated with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, has long engaged in similar outreach. Programs like these offer an astute 
way for the CCP to cultivate relationships with up-and-coming politicians around the 
world. The Hong Kong-based China-United States Exchange Foundation, meanwhile, 
amplifies the voices of Chinese scholars through its website and promotes the positions of 
the Chinese government through the research grants it gives to American institutions. To 
date, China has not endowed university research centers or faculty professorships. If and 
when it does, it will learn that in the West, there are real limits to buying political influ-
ence on campuses and in think tanks. 
 
The Chinese military maintains its own outreach organizations: the China Institute of 
International Strategic Studies and the China Foundation for International and Strategic 
Studies. Both are affiliated with military intelligence and serve as the principal conduits 
for inviting foreign security specialists to China. These two institutions both broadcast 
and receive: in addition to explaining China’s positions on strategic and military issues to 
foreigners, they collect views and intelligence from foreign experts and officials. 
 
Several of China’s foreign policy think tanks perform a comparable dual function. The 
most important of these include the China Institutes of Contemporary International Rela-
tions, the China Institute of International Studies, and the Shanghai Institutes for Interna-
tional Studies—all of which are attached to various parts of the Chinese government. To a 
lesser extent, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences do the same thing, but on a much broader range of issues. In 2009, private donors 
established the Charhar Institute, which focuses specifically on improving China’s over-
seas image. Taken as a whole, this conglomerate of well-funded institutions and initiatives 
aimed at boosting China’s reputation around the world is a testament to the priority Bei-
jing attaches to the effort. 
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Can’t buy me love 
Yet for all the billions of dollars China is spending on these efforts, it has yet to see any 
demonstrable improvement in its global image, at least as measured by public opinion 
surveys. In fact, the country’s reputation has steadily deteriorated. A 2014 BBC poll 
showed that since 2005, positive views about China’s influence had declined by 14 per-
centage points and that a full 49 percent of respondents viewed China negatively. Surpris-
ingly, as a 2013 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project indicates, 
China’s soft-power deficit is apparent even in Africa and Latin America, precisely the 
regions where one would think the country’s appeal would be strongest. 
 
In spite of these meager results, Beijing is still expending enormous effort and re-
sources to change perceptions. Why the disconnect? The answer is that the Chinese gov-
ernment approaches public diplomacy the same way it constructs high-speed rail or 
builds infrastructure—by investing money and expecting to see development. What China 
fails to understand is that despite its world-class culture, cuisine, and human capital, and 
despite its extraordinary economic rise over the last several decades, so long as its political 
system denies, rather than enables, free human development, its propaganda efforts will 
face an uphill battle. 
 
Soft power cannot be bought. It must be earned. And it is best earned when a society’s 
talented citizens are allowed to interact directly with the world, rather than being con-
trolled by authorities. For China, that would mean loosening draconian restraints at home 
and reducing efforts to control opinion abroad. Only then could the country tap its enor-
mous reserves of unrealized soft power. 
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is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the China Policy 
Program at George Washington University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the For-
eign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of China Goes Global: 
The Partial Power. 
Imprint 
 
The publication is created within the 
framework of ifa’s Research Programme  
“Culture and Foreign Policy” and is published  
in the ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy.  
 
The Research Programme is funded by the  
Federal Foreign Office. 
 
The views expressed are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those  
of the ifa. 
 
Publisher: Ines Sieckmann and Odila Triebel  
(ifa - Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e. V.), 
Charlottenplatz 17,  
70173 Stuttgart, P.O. Box 10 24 63,  
D-70020 Stuttgart, info@ifa.de, 
www.ifa.de 
 
© ifa 2018 
 
Editing: Gill McKay, Anja Schön,  
Ines Sieckmann, Sarah Widmaier 
 
Photo credits: © Andreas Mayer, Stuttgart 
 
Design: Eberhard Wolf, Munich 
 
ISBN: 978-3-921970-19-5 
 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17901/AKBP1.01.2018 
 
  
Further ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Publications 
 
 
 
Curd Knüpfer: „Nach der US-Wahl. Handlungsspielräume der 
deutsch-amerikanischen Kulturbeziehungen“ Stuttgart: ifa, 2017 (ifa-
Edition Kultur und Außenpolitik) 
 
 
Stuart MacDonald: “The Impact of Brexit on International Cultural 
Relations in the European Union“ Stuttgart: ifa, 2017 (ifa Edition 
Culture and Foreign Policy) 
 
 
Paul Mihailidis, Liat Racin, Eric Gordon: “Digital Crossroads. Civic 
Media and Migration“ Stuttgart: ifa, 2016 (ifa Edition Culture and 
Foreign Policy) 
 
 
Mathieu Rousselin: “Can Asymmetrical Cooperation be Legitimised? 
Habermas, Foucault and Spivak on German-Tunisian Cooperation in 
Higher Education” Stuttgart: ifa, 2017 (ifa Edition Culture and For-
eign Policy) 
 
 
Available online: publikationen.ifa.de 
 
„ Experiments have […] shown that when a group of  
individuals are given unrestricted access to harvest from 
a common-pool resource, they substantially over use it. 
[…] but changing only one variable, namely,  
the capacity to communicate with one another, indivi-
duals can come to agreements and keep them to harvest 
very close to an optimal level.“ — Elinor Ostrom, 
pioneer researcher on Global Public Goods.
It is understood that only through global cooperation can  
we effectively provide global public goods such as climate 
and security. However, these challenges now occur at a 
time when international patterns of decision making are in 
flux due to the rise of emerging economic and political pow-
ers. Emerging economies, like China, play a crucial role. And 
while we outspokenly share a common interest in providing 
GPGs and mitigating shared negative effects such as climate 
change, many obstacles to cooperation between China and 
Europe remain. As one of the authors mentioned, trust is 
needed to ensure that geostrategic competition is not a 
stronger interest than the common good. As part of public 
diplomacy, engagement for global public goods can aim for 
international reputation and respect. Is China’s engagement 
in the global governance of GPGs credible in terms of China’s 
projected image as a New Responsible Power? 
Authors in this anthology point towards changes in China’s 
mindset and its taking over of new responsibilities in global 
governance. Taking a look at a variety of GPGs, they, in sum, 
sketch a picture of China’s changing role in global govern-
ance and of the remaining differences in ideational concepts 
and political frameworks between China and Europe, that 
have to be taken into account for a more informed and 
sustainable cooperation on GPGs. 
A New Responsible Power 
China?
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